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The First Amendment in Camouflage: Rethinking 
Why We Criminalize Military Speech  
RACHEL E. VANLANDINGHAM* 
An American can tweet “the president is a fucking idiot” and not go to 
jail. Yet if a U.S. soldier does the same, they are committing a federal 
crime. This example is only the tip of the iceberg representing a large 
swath of otherwise constitutionally-protected speech that is 
criminalized only for those in uniform. Like the captain of the Titanic, 
none of the three branches of federal government have bothered to 
carefully chart the dangers of such drastic speech suppression. Nor 
have they provided sufficient lifeboats for those on board in the form of 
substantive limitations regarding the types of speech that can land a 
servicemember in jail. This Article explores why this situation exists and 
recommends a safer course. 
 
To navigate, this Article analyzes how the federal military speech 
crimes deviate from civilian criminal law, highlighting the former’s 
deficiencies while laying out a clear path of straight-forward statutory 
reform. The military courts’ messy speech jurisprudence is critically 
examined, with the Supreme Court’s seminal incitement law’s doctrinal 
development as the backdrop. This Article paints this larger landscape 
to demonstrate that the military speech doctrine, an expanded 
“dangerous speech” approach to what is unprotected speech, took an 
early off-ramp from the Court’s more protective speech law 
development. Linked to the worst excesses of the Espionage and 
Sedition Acts of 1917 and 1918, the current military speech doctrine 
fails to require clear causation of harm, thus allowing persecution of 
disliked ideas. 
 
This Article recommends replacing the military speech doctrine with 
approaches that far better align with the modern Court’s speech 
jurisprudence. The most expansive speech crimes should be subject to 
strict scrutiny, and the Sedition Act crime of “service-discrediting 
conduct” wholly eliminated. However, due to the unique military harm 
some speech poses, this Article concludes that a discrete list of military 
speech crimes should remain unprotected by the First Amendment due 
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to their nature as speech integral to crime, a long-recognized 
unprotected speech category.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”1 
 
An Army officer recently tweeted that the Secretary of Defense is “the most 
vile, evil fuck in the current administration.”2 He could go to jail for that Twitter 
comment because his speech is a military crime.3 And that is not the only type 
of speech that a civilian can utter with relative impunity, but could subject a 
service-member to a court-martial resulting in confinement and a punitive 
discharge. For example, a Marine major was sentenced to jail in 2016 for talking 
to a Washington Post reporter, a discussion in which he prevaricated about 
personal details regarding a previous sexual assault prosecution.4 The military’s 
reason for criminalizing such speech was that it constituted “conduct 
unbecoming an officer and gentleman,” hence warranting punishment.5  
Indeed, a large swath of constitutionally protected speech for civilians falls 
outside the First Amendment’s protective shield if uttered by a member of our 
armed forces, despite the maxim that the “government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”6 
Of course this principle does not fully hold true even outside the armed forces. 
Our government can lawfully and appropriately suppress speech through 
criminalization because of its message in contexts such as incitement, and 
threatening, obscene, defamatory, or fraudulent, speech.7  
However, the military penal code criminalizes much more speech than that 
falling within these narrow categories. A military member can be prosecuted 
for, among other crimes: disloyal speech; insubordinate language against 
superiors; false official statements; mutinous speech; provoking speech; speech 
                                                                                                                     
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2 Jared Keller, Marco Rubio’s War on This Communist West Point Grad May Blow Up 
in His Face, TASK & PURPOSE (Oct. 4, 2017), https://taskandpurpose.com/communist-west-
point-army-rubio/ [https://perma.cc/B4D2-LMQN]. 
 3 See id.  
 4 See Hope Hodge Seck, Marine Officer to Plead Guilty to Lying About Sex with 
Trainees, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/marine-officer-to-
plead-guilty-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/X9QR-R2QD]. See also infra, Part III.B. 
 5 Seck, supra note 4. 
 6 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)); see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
382 (1992); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“[T]he First 
Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does not countenance 
governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals.”); 
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443 (1996) (calling this a “keystone” of First 
Amendment doctrine). 
 7 See infra Part III.B (describing traditional categories of unprotected speech); see also 
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1770–71 (2004). 
76 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:1 
considered “conduct unbecoming an officer;” and speech considered 
“prejudicial to good order and discipline” or “of a nature to bring discredit upon 
the armed services.”8 The Army officer’s tweet calling Secretary James Mattis 
an epithet is a crime punishable up to a year in prison and dismissal from the 
service under the provision making it a crime for an officer to refer to the 
President and certain other public officials using “contemptuous words.”9 
This Article excavates the rather messy judicial rationale supporting this 
disparate application of the First Amendment to highlight its superficial, 
speculative nature and analytical weaknesses. Essentially, the courts have 
allowed broad criminalization of military speech for reasons of national 
security, a common rationale for speech persecution in this country—and as in 
the past, such reasoning lacks objective standards and is riddled with 
ambiguity.10 Using the suspect “clear and present danger” rationale borrowed 
from the repressive World War I Espionage and Sedition Acts era, the Supreme 
Court held over forty years ago that uniquely military speech crimes are 
constitutionally legitimate because of their supposed military necessity, and has 
not directly revisited the issue since.11  
As with all criminal law, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the 
military’s penal code, serves as a tangible manifestation of society’s collective 
moral condemnation of behavior.12 Uniquely, this code represents two societies’ 
opprobrium—that of both the military and ostensibly that of greater America. 
Hence, this Article urges greater scrutiny of uniquely military UCMJ speech 
crimes, given the seemingly disparate moral calculations of each society. And 
while there are relatively few military speech crime prosecutions, the ability to 
prosecute risks the reality that such crimes currently chill much speech—
particularly given the military’s extensive disciplinary schema.13 Specifically, 
                                                                                                                     
 8 See infra Part II.A–C (detailing three categories of military speech crimes found in 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946(a) (2012)).  
 9 This restriction also prohibits using contemptuous language against Congress; a safe 
harbor is seemingly found in “purely private” speech. See infra Part II.B (explaining 10 
U.S.C. § 888 (2006)).  
 10 See infra Part III.C (detailing the Court’s rationale for allowing the criminalization 
of anti-war and other dissenting speech under the Espionage and Sedition Acts). 
 11 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974); see also infra Part IV.A. 
 12 See generally H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963) (explaining 
criminal law’s incorporation of society’s collective moral condemnation); H.L.A. Hart, 
Punishment and Responsibility, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 642 (1969) [hereinafter Hart, 
Punishment] (critically discussing the philosophical underpinnings of criminal law in 
general).  
 13 Service-member speech is also suppressed through administrative measures, and 
such lesser actions typically revolve around the Code’s list of offenses. See LAWRENCE J. 
MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 158–65 (2010) (describing UCMJ’s 
Article 15 non-judicial punishment and lesser military justice administrative measures that, 
along with criminal provisions, constitute the overall military justice arena). See generally 
Rachel E. VanLandingham, Discipline, Justice, and Command in the U.S. Military: 
Maximizing Strengths and Minimizing Weaknesses in a Special Society, 50 NEW ENG. L. 
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this Article focuses on UCMJ speech crimes to analyze: (1) how and why the 
military’s speech crimes differ from the rest of American criminal law and 
whether structural defects in said crimes require reform; and (2) how the 
Supreme Court’s and the military courts’ doctrinal reconciliation of such 
divergence allows more speech to be suppressed than both necessary and 
desirable.14  
This Article nests its inquiry in a pragmatic approach to free speech that 
focuses more on the usefulness of the UCMJ’s speech restrictions than on their 
harmony with fundamental principles.15 Given that most military speech-
suppressive crimes were inherited from George III’s eighteenth  century Army, 
this Article criticizes the reigning jurisprudential approach for assuming they 
are still functionally required; essentially, it asks whether such speech is harmful 
to the military.16 Furthermore, this Article asks, even if military speech is 
harmful, whether it is sufficiently harmful to justify suppression despite the 
country’s preference and functional need for expressive freedom.17  
Others have also urged more attention be paid to military speech crimes. 
Scholars have infrequently turned their sights on military speech restrictions 
                                                                                                                     
REV. 21 (2015) (explaining the strengths and weaknesses of the way in which the military 
justice system operates and attempts to control speech). 
 14 The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. Chapter 47, was enacted 
in 1950 to comprehensively overhaul the administration of justice within the military after 
serious deficiencies were identified in World War II. See generally Walter T. Cox III, The 
Army, the Courts, and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice, 118 MIL. L. REV. 
1 (1987) (detailing UCMJ reforms). 
 15 See Richard A. Posner, The Speech Market and The Legacy of Schenck, in 
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 121, 121 (Lee C. Bollinger & 
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) [hereinafter ETERNALLY VIGILANT] (describing an 
instrumental approach to freedom of speech); see also Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism 
Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 739 (2002) 
(suggesting the pragmatic approach to free speech is not foreclosed by the language of the 
First Amendment or case law). 
 16 That today’s military is radically different from even immediately post-World War 
II is an understatement; it has been an all-volunteer force since the 1970s; it is one that is 
highly-educated; and it is one that allows individuals to openly serve regardless of gender or 
sexual orientation, and hopefully soon will allow transgender personnel to openly serve as 
well. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. ET AL., 2015 DEMOGRAPHICS: PROFILE OF THE MILITARY 
COMMUNITY 18, http://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/2015- 
Demographics-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RBL6-4CJV] (detailing that, in 2015, 15.5% of 
all active duty military personnel were women, and 15.1% of all active duty enlisted military 
personnel were women.); see also Kim Parker et al., 6 Facts About the U.S. Military and Its 
Changing Demographics, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/04/13/6-facts-about-the-u-s-military-and-its-changing-demographics/ 
[https://perma.cc/W5U3-5F8G] (explaining that more than 80% of Department of defense 
active-duty officers have at least a bachelor’s degree, and of those, 42% have an advanced 
degree).  
 17 See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1321 
(1992) (“[R]obust free speech systems protect speech not because it is harmless, but despite 
the harm it may cause.”). 
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since the 1950s, with the most sustained scholarly focus following the Vietnam 
War.18 Since then attention has been sporadic, with recent emphasis on the 
relevance of social media.19 With a few exceptions, much of the extant 
scholarship rather uncritically notes the justifications given by the military and 
the courts for the punishment of military speech.20 None carefully places the 
general jurisprudential approach to military speech crimes into the greater 
landscape that is First Amendment speech doctrine. Hence, existing literature 
overlooks the importance of criminal law concepts, such as causation and intent, 
that the Court grappled with in its foundational speech cases. It thus fails to 
assess how the military speech doctrine unsuccessfully resolves their roles as 
important limitations on the government’s ability to suppress speech due to its 
content. This Article undertakes this missing landscape work and makes a 
normative argument that such criminal law concepts are needed to reinforce 
military speech crimes’ constitutionality as well.  
Part II of this Article arranges the UCMJ’s penal provisions into three broad 
speech categories for analytical clarity, highlighting their divergence from 
civilian speech crimes. Part III sketches the contours of the Court’s modern 
speech doctrine, briefly examining the early evolution of First Amendment 
speech jurisprudence. This short visit with Justice Holmes and the famous 
                                                                                                                     
 18 See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, Free Speech in the Armed Forces, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 187, 
187–88 (1957) (noting, as a seminal military speech article, that given Cold War exigencies, 
discipline and civilian control of the military require greater speech suppression in the 
military context); Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 
183 (1962). See generally James T. Murphy, Freedom of Speech in the Military, 8 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 761 (1974) (urging greater scrutiny to the general articles while finding traditional 
speech crimes unproblematic); Donald N. Zillman, Free Speech and Military Command, 
UTAH L. REV. 423 (1977) (focusing on command free speech based on two general officer 
misconduct cases); Donald N. Zillman & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Constitutional Rights and 
Military Necessity: Reflections on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1976) 
(noting that changes such as elimination of the draft require re-thinking of necessity of 
onerous military speech restrictions). 
 19 See, e.g., John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balance 
Between Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REV. 303, 350 (1998) (defending 
military speech restrictions); Michael C. Friess, A Specialized Society: Speech Offenses in 
the Military, 2009 ARMY L. 18, 19 (2009); David Johnsen, Free Speech on the Battlefield: 
Protecting the Use of Social Media by America’s Soldiers, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1085, 
1085 (2011) (highlighting the increased use of social media by military members that 
requires more flexible responses); Lawrence Jude Morris, Free Speech in the Military, 65 
MARQ. L. REV. 660, 660 (1982) (providing a thoughtful critique of reasons for criminal 
military speech suppression); Emily Reuter, Second Class Citizen Soldiers: A Proposal for 
Greater First Amendment Protections for America’s Military Personnel, 16 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 315, 317 (2007) (criticizing military speech doctrine); see also Jeremy S. Weber, 
Political Speech, the Military, and the Age of Viral Communication, 69 A.F. L. REV. 91, 94 
(2013) (arguing that military members’ political speech on social media poses a grave threat 
to U.S. democracy); cf. Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, Disloyalty Among “Men in Arms”: Korean 
War POWs at Court-Martial, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1629 (2004) (deconstructing military 
aims in POW prosecutions for disloyal conduct). 
 20 See infra Part IV. 
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Schenck line of cases demonstrates how the military speech doctrine took an 
early left turn off the Court’s much longer road of speech jurisprudence. Part IV 
outlines the military appellate courts’ typical approach to military speech 
crimes—what I call the military speech doctrine—to reveal how it retains the 
same analytical illnesses that the Court tried to cure in its more mature civilian 
speech jurisprudence. 
Part V argues for both an improved statutory schema, and for a more 
rigorous doctrinal approach to military speech crimes that aligns with the 
modern Court’s approach to the First Amendment. Specifically, I make three 
recommendations: first, replace the extant military speech doctrine with the 
strict scrutiny approach, while concomitantly classifying the majority of UCMJ 
speech crimes as unprotected “speech integral to crime.”21 Second, I urge that 
the crime of service-discrediting speech (and other conduct) be dropped from 
the UCMJ due to its vestigial, Espionage-Sedition Act nature and anti-
democratic effects. Finally, I advocate for significant UCMJ reform that 
transforms most Article 134 speech crimes—those currently penalized under 
the prejudicial to good order and discipline and service-discrediting clauses of 
Article 134—into standalone offenses that do not depend on any such collateral 
effects.22  
This Article concludes by noting that such legislative and jurisprudential 
changes would increase the effectiveness of sanctions against truly harmful 
speech by military members. These changes would also better align the military 
speech doctrine with the modern First Amendment, not for the sake of doctrinal 
neatness, but as a pragmatic push to ensure speech values, military 
effectiveness, and democracy are appropriately considered. 
II. MILITARY CRIMINAL SPEECH  
The UCMJ is the military’s penal code, listing crimes drafted by Congress 
in fulfillment of its constitutional duty “[t]o make Rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”23 This modern code has ancient roots, 
                                                                                                                     
 21 See infra Part IV.B. See generally Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal 
Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 981 (2016) (providing terrific analysis of how 
the speech integral to crime exception can be used to cover types of content-based speech 
restrictions for which the Court does not want to create a “new” category). 
 22 This last suggestion is one for Congress to modernize the UCMJ to clearly highlight 
crimes for the harms they truly represent: for example, child pornography is a crime 
regardless of its effect on good order and discipline, yet the UCMJ criminalizes only when 
it has such an effect. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, Pt. IV, ¶ 68b (2016) 
[hereinafter MCM]. I suggest the same modification for non-speech “general disorders” 
crimes as well. 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14; see also id. at cl. 16 (“To provide for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be 
employed in the Service of the United States . . . .”). 
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as do most of its provisions that punish and therefore restrict speech.24 This Part 
establishes how the UCMJ criminalizes servicemember speech through its 
statutory offenses, identifying three types of speech crimes amongst the UCMJ’s 
over sixty criminal articles.25 I establish this penal code speech-crime typology 
to highlight the distinctions between military and civilian speech crimes. This 
schema also allows me to later situate such crimes within the First Amendment 
doctrinal landscape. The following typology includes: (1) common law speech-
integral crimes; (2) uniquely military speech-integral crimes; and (3) uniquely 
military catch-all crimes. 
A. Common Law Speech-Integral Crimes  
The UCMJ includes several specific speech26 crimes that mirror, for the 
most part, similar speech crimes in civilian jurisdictions. They are speech crimes 
because their criminality turns on speech, or one of their listed alternative modes 
of commission is speech; the crimes “are actually defined in terms of 
communication.”27 For example, perjury requires speech with a particular 
content.28 The gravamen of harm of perjury, the damage society is trying to 
punish and hence prevent, is the deceit perpetrated on a court by what is said. 
The military, just as in the common law and modern civilian penal codes, 
criminalizes such deceitful speech when uttered under oath in a judicial 
proceeding.29  
This category consists only of those crimes with an element that turns on 
the content of speech per se, and for which an equivalent speech crime is also 
typically found in modern civilian jurisdictions.30 Of course, the military and 
civilian penal codes include myriads of common law crimes that could possibly 
be committed by the use of speech, such as a robbery in which a bank robber 
                                                                                                                     
 24 The United States inherited the Articles of War from Great Britain before formal 
independence; the Navy and Army used the Articles of War until May 31, 1951 when the 
UCMJ came into effect. See Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Military Justice, in THE MODERN 
AMERICAN MILITARY 243–44 (David M. Kennedy ed., 2013) (noting the history of the 
UCMJ); MORRIS, supra note 13, at 14.  
 25 The UCMJ contains 63 distinct punitive articles depending on one’s categorization; 
some articles, such as Article 112, include two provisions, Article 112 and Article 112a, 
which I count separately; additionally, some contain several separate offenses, such as 
Article 92 (which outlines three distinct crimes). See MCM, supra note 22, at Pt. IV, ¶¶ 16 
& 36–37. Additionally, Article 134, in addition to the three alternate crimes contained in its 
language, lists fifty-six exemplary Article 134 crimes. See id. at Pt. IV, ¶ 60. 
 26 Speech includes words, as well as expressive, communicative conduct. See, e.g., 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Not 
a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723 (2011) (arguing the Roberts court has consistently 
ruled against free speech claims when brought by those who challenge the government’s 
national security and military policies).  
 27 Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645, 648 (1980). 
 28 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994) (describing the elements of perjury generally). 
 29 10 U.S.C. § 931 (2012). 
 30 See id. 
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hands a teller a demand note.31 These are not speech crimes because their 
criminality does not turn on speech, despite the fact that speech may 
occasionally be instrumental to their commission. Professor Greenawalt uses 
the example of a person with a flashlight telling someone to turn left on a dark 
path, knowing there is a cliff in that direction, so that the person who cannot see 
will fall off the cliff;32 while speech was definitely part of the killing, the crime 
of murder does not turn on speech.  
Most category one military speech crimes date back to the 1775 Articles of 
War inherited from the British.33 They include solicitation;34 extortion;35 
perjury;36 principal (accomplice) liability;37 conspiracy;38 criminal fraud and 
fraudulent enlistment;39 sedition;40 espionage;41 breach of the peace;42 
                                                                                                                     
 31 See also United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The first 
amendment does not provide a defense to a criminal charge simply because the actor uses 
words to carry out his illegal purpose.”). 
 32 Greenawalt, supra note 27, at 648. 
 33 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 720 (2d ed. Washington 
Government Printing Office 1920) (1896).  
 34 10 U.S.C.A. § 882 (West 2016). Article 82 specifically prohibits solicitation to 
commit the uniquely military crimes of desertion and misbehavior before the enemy, as well 
as the UCMJ’s crime of sedition. Solicitation to commit other crimes listed in the UCMJ 
falls under the general article, Article 134, as specified by the President and includes an 
additional terminal element as described infra Part II.C.2. 
 35 10 U.S.C. § 927 (2012) (“Any person subject to this chapter who communicates 
threats to another person with the intention thereby to obtain anything of value or any 
acquittance, advantage, or immunity is guilty of extortion . . . .”). 
 36 10 U.S.C. § 931 (2012).  
 37 This provision is a hybrid because it is a mode of liability that makes the perpetrator 
liable for a separate UCMJ crime and speech is an alternative mode of violation. 10 U.S.C. 
§ 877 (2012) (“[A] person . . . [who] . . . aids, abets, counsels, commands, or procures [the] 
commission [of an offense]; or . . . causes an act to be done which if directly performed by 
him would be punishable by this chapter.”) (emphasis added). Article 78, Accessory After 
the Fact, also criminalizes speech when someone through speech “receives, comforts, or 
assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial, or punishment.” 10 
U.S.C. § 878 (2012).  
 38 10 U.S.C. § 881 (2006) (requiring an agreement and overt act).  
 39 10 U.S.C.A. § 932 (West 2016); 10 U.S.C.A. § 883 (West 2016) (Article 132 
prohibits frauds against the United States, similar to the federal code whereas Article 83 
tailors fraud to the military context by specifically carving out a prohibition for fraudulent 
enlistment, appointment, and separation). 
 40 10 U.S.C. § 894 (2012) (criminalizing both mutiny and sedition as separate offenses 
under same article; sedition is defined as any person “with intent to cause the overthrow or 
destruction of lawful civil authority, creates, in concert with any other person, revolt, 
violence, or other disturbance against that authority is guilty of sedition”).  
 41 10 U.S.C. § 906(a) (2006). 
 42 10 U.S.C. § 916 (2012).  
82 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:1 
provoking words and gestures;43 and forgery.44 Though lacking a common law 
bloodline, the UCMJ crimes of stalking45 and non-consensual distribution of 
sexual photos46 also turn on speech and are also criminalized in some civilian 
jurisdictions; hence I include them in this category as well.47 Critically, these 
speech-integral military analogues of civilian common law crimes today pose 
little First Amendment concern, largely because of their classification into their 
own unprotected category of speech.48 This leaves this overall category largely 
non-problematic regarding constitutional free speech concerns.49 
B. Uniquely Military Speech-Integral Crimes  
The second type of military speech crimes this Article analyzes consists of 
crimes that are uniquely military—that is, with no civilian analogue—and 
primarily turn on the content of speech. Leading this pack is UCMJ Article 88, 
which criminalizes the use of contemptuous words by commissioned officers 
against the president and other civilian leaders of the military, as well as 
Congress as a body.50 Other uniquely military crimes that turn either solely on 
speech or include speech as an alternative actus reus, (the element of required 
conduct), include: disrespect toward a superior commissioned officer;51 
                                                                                                                     
 43 10 U.S.C. § 917 (2012) (criminalizing gestures or words that are directed “towards 
any other person subject to this chapter” and are “provoking or reproachful”); Analogous 
civilian crimes include California Penal Code breach of the peace statute, which includes a 
fighting words provision similar to Art. 117. CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 2016). For a 
discussion of the constitutionality of banning fighting words see generally Sean Clark, 
Misconceptions About the Fighting Words Exception, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC. 
(Sept. 20, 2006), https://www.thefire.org/misconceptions-about-the-fighting-words-
exception/ [https://perma.cc/9QFR-4YFG] (“[T]he Supreme Court has effectively limited 
the exception to only include abusive language, exchanged face to face, which would likely 
provoke a violent reaction.”). 
 44 10 U.S.C.A. § 923 (West 2016).  
 45 10 U.S.C.A. § 920(a) (West 2006). Speech is an alternative element of stalking. 
Expressive conduct is viewed as speech. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971). 
 46 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 920(c) (West 2006), which criminalizes distributing intimate 
photos taken without consent whereas a new provision enacted by Congress in 2017 
criminalizes those taken with consent, but non-consensually distributed (so called “revenge 
porn”). 
 47 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.5A (2017) (prohibiting disclosure of private 
images). 
 48 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (citation omitted) (listing 
“speech integral to criminal conduct” as one of the categories of unprotected speech). See 
generally Volokh, supra note 21. 
 49 But see Andrew Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First Amendment 
Exceptions, 65 EMORY L.J. 661, 663 (2016) (describing the constitutional speech concerns 
raised by similar civilian crimes). 
 50 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006).  
 51 10 U.S.C.A. § 889 (West 2016).  
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insubordinate conduct toward non-commissioned officer;52 cruelty and 
maltreatment;53 subordinate compelling surrender;54 improper use of 
countersign;55 false official statement;56 and mutiny.57 I also include three other 
uniquely military crimes in this category because speech may, as one of the 
alternative acts, trigger their sanction: Articles 90, 91, and 92 each include a 
provision criminalizing disobedience of orders.58 The primary difference 
amongst these three crimes is the source of the order disobeyed: superior 
commissioned officer (Article 90(2)); non-commissioned officer (Article 91); 
and general officer (Article 92); Article 92 also criminalizes the disobedience of 
specific types of regulations as well as dereliction of duty.59 
A violation of one of these provisions constitutes a uniquely military speech 
crime when the violated order itself prohibits a particular type of speech. For 
example, a superior may order a subordinate to not speak to a fellow 
servicemember while at work about matters unrelated to their duties.60 Violation 
of this order would clearly turn on the content of the order recipient’s speech, 
and this disobedience could be charged as a violation of one of these three 
provisions, depending on the rank of the superior. These provisions are not 
without limits, as the spectrum of speech that can be made subject to such an 
order is a relatively narrow one. While military orders are presumed to be 
lawful,61 lawful orders must be directly related to military duty.62  
                                                                                                                     
 52 10 U.S.C. § 891 (2012) (“Insubordinate conduct toward warrant officer, 
noncommissioned officer, or petty officer.”). 
 53 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2012). While this crime can be committed without speech, the 
MCM discussion demonstrates that speech also can serve as the required act: “sexual 
harassment may constitute this offense . . . [this] includes influencing, offering to influence, 
or threatening the career, pay, or job of another person in exchange for sexual favors, and 
deliberate or repeated offensive comments or gestures of a sexual nature.” See MCM, supra 
note 22, at Pt. IV, ¶ IV-26.  
 54 10 U.S.C. § 900 (2012) (“Any person subject to this chapter who compels or attempts 
to compel the commander of any place, vessel, aircraft, or other military property, or of any 
body of members of the armed forces, to give it up to an enemy or to abandon it, or who 
strikes the colors or flag to any enemy without proper authority . . . .”). 
 55 10 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (“Any person . . . who . . . discloses the parole or countersign 
to any person not entitled to receive it . . . .”). 
 56 10 U.S.C.A. § 907 (West 2016) (“Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent 
to deceive, signs any false record, return, regulation, order, or other official document, 
knowing it to be false, or makes any other false official statement knowing it to be 
false . . . .”). 
 57 18 U.S.C. § 2192 (2012). 
 58 Each Article separately criminalizes other behavior such as assaulting a superior 
officer, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (2012), or non-commissioned officer, id. at § 891, and dereliction 
of duty, id. at § 892. 
 59 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2012). 
 60 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 58 M.J. 466, 468 (C.A.A.F. 2003). 
 61 Orders are presumed lawful unless they involve ordering a crime. See MCM, supra 
note 22, at Part IV, ¶ 14.c.(2)(a)(i). 
 62 Directly-related “includes all activities reasonably necessary to accomplish a military 
mission, or safeguard or promote the morale, discipline, and usefulness of members of a 
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Article 92 also criminalizes failure to obey military regulations.63 Similar to 
how Articles 90, 91, and 92 can turn on speech through the type of order given 
(if it involves speech), Article 92(2)’s criminalization of disobedience of a 
general regulation likewise turns on speech when a particular regulation 
prohibits types of speech. In other words, Article 92(2) constitutes a speech-
integral crime for this speech typology when the underlying punitive64 order or 
regulation prohibits certain speech.65 For example, an Army regulation prohibits 
“recruiting or training members (including encouraging other Soldiers to join)” 
extremist organizations, a prohibition which, at least regarding recruiting, turns 
on speech, and is explicitly punishable under Article 92, UCMJ.66 
C. Catch-All Speech Crimes 
The third category of this Article’s military speech crimes typology consists 
of two unusual UCMJ provisions: Article 133, “Conduct Unbecoming of An 
Officer and a Gentleman,” and Article 134, the “General Article.”67 These 
“catch-all” articles were originally designed to cover all misconduct harmful to 
the military that was not already criminalized in the other UCMJ provisions. 
Article 133 sets a vague baseline standard of behavior for officers and cadets, 
whereas Article 134, often referred to as the “general disorders” provision, 
contains three separate crimes.68  
                                                                                                                     
command and directly connected with the maintenance of good order in the service.” Id. at 
Part IV, ¶ 14.c.(2)(a)(iv); see also United States v. Womack, 29 M.J. 88, 90 (C.M.A. 1989) 
(explaining that a lawful order must have a valid military purpose and a specific mandate). 
 63 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2012). 
 64 Violations of military regulations constitute Article 90 violations only when the 
underlying regulation is “punitive” in nature; the regulation must, in accordance with the fair 
notice due process principle, explicitly state that disobedience could result in prosecution. 
See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 51-903, DISSIDENT AND PROTEST ACTIVITIES 1 (July 30,  
2015), https://www.littlerock.af.mil/Portals/25/documents/EO%20Folder/Dissident%20and 
%20Protest%20Activities%20afi51-903.pdf?ver=2016-06-02-113803-493 
[https://perma.cc/J387-79TP] [hereinafter AFI 51-903] (“[M]embers who violate [these] 
prohibitions . . . are subject to disciplinary action under Article 92, or other applicable 
articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.”); see also MCM, supra note 22, at Pt. IV, 
¶ 16.c.(2)(a)–(c). 
 65 In contrast, most regulations deal with physical conduct. For example, the services 
each have regulations that allow commanders to prohibit visiting particular off-base 
establishments. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, INSTR. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY, 
¶ 4-12b (Nov. 6, 2014) http://gordon.army.mil/sharp/downloads/Army_Command_Policy_ 
AR_600-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZP2-G67M] [hereinafter AR600-20]; see also AFI 51-
903, supra note 64, at ¶ 3.  
 66 AR 600-20, supra note 65, at ¶ 4-12.b(4); see also AFI 51-903, supra note 64, at 
¶ 4.1 (prohibiting actively participating in, such as by recruiting for, extremist organizations).  
 67 10 U.S.C. §§ 933–34 (1958). 
 68 Id. 
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These articles warrant their own category because of their sheer breadth and 
vagueness.69 Unlike category two speech crimes which specify the type of 
prohibited speech, Articles 133 and 134 fail to specify, on their face, the 
prohibited actus reus outside of such conduct’s claimed effect.70 As long as the 
conduct such as speech fits the required terminal elements of unbecoming an 
officer (Article 133), or service-discrediting or prejudicial to good order and 
discipline (Article 134)—then any speech will suffice.71  
1. Article 133 Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman 
“Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of 
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct.”72 
 
Article 133 allows the military to punish officer speech it dislikes by 
claiming that the expressive act is unbecoming an officer and gentlemen.73 This 
occurred in the 2017 case of Major Mark Thompson, in which the military 
convicted a Marine Corps officer for, among other things, lying to a Washington 
Post reporter because said speech, according to the military, was conduct 
unbecoming.74 The MCM defines conduct unbecoming as that which seriously 
dishonors or disgraces the officer personally or officially.75 This provision can 
                                                                                                                     
 69 The military courts have consistently ruled against obvious vagueness challenges, 
with the Supreme Court’s approval. Parker, 417 U.S. at 759–60. See generally Edward J. 
Imwinkelried & Donald N. Zillman, An Evolution in the First Amendment: Overbreadth 
Analysis and Free Speech Within the Military Community, 54 TEX. L. REV. 42 (1977) 
(arguing that the Burger Court adopted a very liberal test for attacking proscriptions upon 
First Amendment activities). 
 70 10 U.S.C. §§ 933–34 (1958). 
 71 In exemplary contrast, the disobedience crimes provide second-order criminalization 
of speech in that a pre-existing order has to first exist to be violated, thereby putting a 
servicemember on notice regarding potential criminality. 
 72 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1958). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Marine Corps Major Mark Thompson pleaded guilty to, amongst other charges, an 
Article 133 charge in April 2017 for giving an interview to the Washington Post full of 
prevarications about his previous conviction regarding fraternization with and sexual assault 
of Annapolis midshipmen. See Matthew Cox, Major Gets 90 Days in the Brig for Lying 
About Sexual Misconduct, MILITARY.COM (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.military.com/daily-
news/2017/04/14/major-gets-90-days-brig-lying-sexual-misconduct.html 
[https://perma.cc/AQ5Y-9B7E]; see also Ann E. Marimow, Marine in Sexual Misconduct 




 75 “[A]ction or behavior in an official capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing the 
person as an officer, seriously compromises the officer’s character as a gentleman, or action 
or behavior in an unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing the officer 
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be used to charge misconduct that is already criminalized separately in the 
UCMJ, as well as speech that is not otherwise made criminal by the UCMJ or 
other federal law. Article 133 is unlike Article 134, which is limited only to the 
crimes not otherwise criminal per the UCMJ via the preemption doctrine.76  
Article 133 was without historical precedence in ancient armies until 1765, 
when the British introduced a similar provision into their Articles of War.77 The 
UCMJ’s Article 133, originally Article 61, was copied directly from those 
extant 1765 British Articles of War into the Continental Congress’s first Articles 
of War in 1775,78 and repeated without change until a Congressional 
modification in 1806 expanded its reach.79 Article 61 originally required the 
dismissal of the officer upon conviction, an indication of the severity of the 
misconduct this Article was originally designed to punish.80 Congress dropped 
this requirement in its 1950 UCMJ reform, thus allowing a range of sentences, 
and in doing so diluting the gravamen of harm required to charge this offense.81  
The Army’s military judges’ benchbook’s definition of conduct 
unbecoming echoes Colonel William Winthrop’s famous early twentieth 
century treatise on military law, and has been cited by the Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces (CAAF), the military’s highest appellate court,82 without 
criticism.83 The benchbook defines “[u]nbecoming conduct” as “misbehavior 
more serious than slight, and of a material and pronounced character. It means 
conduct morally unfitting and unworthy rather than merely inappropriate or 
unsuitable misbehavior which is more than opposed to good taste or 
                                                                                                                     
personally, seriously compromises the person’s standing as an officer.” MCM, supra note 
22, at Pt. IV-112, ¶ 59.c.(2) (citing without attribution WINTHROP, supra note 33, at 710). 
 76 See infra Part II.C.2; MORRIS, supra note 13, at 85 (noting that the maximum 
punishment for conduct that is not otherwise criminal but violates Article 133 because of its 
unbecoming nature is either that provided for the most analogous UCMJ article, or one year 
confinement if not otherwise specified, plus dismissal and total forfeiture of pay and 
allowances).  
 77 See Gilbert G. Ackroyd, The General Articles, Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, 35 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 264, 271 (1961). Little is known as to the 
impetus behind this addition. See id. at 271–72. 
 78 See WINTHROP, supra note 33, at 710. 
 79 See id. (originally requiring that the behavior be of a “scandalous and infamous” 
manner, Congress deleted the requirement in 1806 in an “effort to extend materially the 
scope of the Article”). 
 80 Ackroyd, supra note 77, at 272. 
 81 See id. (describing the 1951 change). 
 82 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) and its predecessor, the Court 
of Military Appeals (CMA) was created by Congress as part of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, enacted in 1950. The services each have lower appellate criminal courts from which 
CAAF hears primarily discretionary appeals. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 867 (West 2016). 
 83 See United States v. Norvell, 26 M.J. 477, 480 (C.M.A. 1988) (citing the judge’s use 
of the judge’s benchbook definition of conduct unbecoming in an Article 133 specification 
dealing with speech; specifically, appellant, an Air Force captain, pleaded guilty to the 
conduct unbecoming nature of her communication to an enlisted personnel regarding how to 
catheterize oneself to avoid illegal drug use during a urinalysis). 
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propriety.”84 CAAF has further clarified that while “we accept the premise that 
a commissioned officer may be held to a higher standard of accountability for 
his conduct than an enlisted member or a civilian . . . not every delict or misstep 
warrants punishment under Article 133. In general, it must be so disgraceful as 
to render an officer unfit for service.”85 CAAF has also stated that “it is sufficient 
that the offender’s behavior seriously exposes him or her to public 
opprobrium.”86  
2. Article 134 General Disorders 
“Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and 
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all 
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces . . . shall be 
punished . . . .”87  
 
Whereas Article 133 only applies to officers and officers-in-training, thus 
setting a higher standard of daily conduct for officers than for enlisted personnel, 
Article 134 applies to everyone subject to court-martial jurisdiction.88 
Consisting of three distinct crimes, Article 134’s first two provisions, which are 
the most frequently used, set an ambiguous baseline standard of conduct 
regarding behavior that has a nexus to military service.89 Article 134 prohibits 
conduct that is either prejudicial to good order and discipline or “of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the services” (typically referred to as “service-discrediting” 
behavior); its third prong simply allows the military to charge certain federal 
and state crimes.90  
                                                                                                                     
 84 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, DA PAMPHLET 27-9, THE JUDGE’S BENCHBOOK 574 (2002), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Military-Judges-Benchbook-2002.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7FRL-XEAR] (providing model jury instructions regarding the UCMJ 
offenses). If the conduct is in an official capacity, it is that “which, in dishonoring or 
disgracing the individual as a (commissioned officer) (cadet) (midshipman) seriously 
detracts from his character as a gentleman.” Id. at 575. Regarding unofficial or private 
conduct, it defines conduct as unbecoming if “in dishonoring or disgracing the individual 
personally, seriously detracts from [his] standing as a[n] . . . officer.” Id. at 574. 
 85 United States v. Guaglione, 27 M.J. 268, 271 (C.M.A. 1988). 
 86 United States v. Shober, 26 M.J. 501, 502 (A.F.C.M.R. 1986). The tension is 
obvious—while CAAF implies that this Article should be reserved for only such conduct for 
which dismissal from service is warranted, which was the Article’s original mandatory 
penalty, it undercuts that implication through its description of requisite conduct as “morally 
unfitting and unworthy,” leaving the military free to charge less serious conduct including 
speech as conduct unbecoming. See Cox, supra note 74. 
 87 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1958). 
 88 Id.; see Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987) (holding that the 
jurisdiction of a court-martial is dependent solely on the accused’s status as a member of the 
armed forces and should not take into account the service connection of the crime charged). 
 89 See 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1958). 
 90 See id. Article 134’s third clause allows the military to court-martial noncapital 
offenses not otherwise contained in the UCMJ but found in the federal code, as well as those 
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Crimes similar to Article 134’s prejudicial to good order and discipline 
provision have been part of military codes for centuries; this version was 
inherited from the British in 1775 by the U.S. Continental Congress.91 While 
Article 134’s prejudice to good order and discipline clause is ancient, its service-
discrediting crime clause two wasn’t added until 1916.92 Instead of focusing on 
conduct that undermines the efficacy of a military unit, as its ancient cousin 
does, this newer provision makes punishable only the vaguely-described 
discrediting conduct.93 Separately, military commanders are prohibited from 
charging conduct under either clause when that conduct is proscribed by another 
UCMJ crime; the preemption doctrine limits Article 134’s first two clauses only 
to behavior that is not otherwise criminalized in the Code.94  
a. “To the Prejudice of Good Order and Discipline” 
Despite Article 134’s catch-all clauses withstanding vagueness and 
overbreadth challenges, their contours are not crisp. The MCM echoes CAAF, 
defining “to the prejudice of good order and discipline” as those “acts directly 
prejudicial to good order and discipline,” excluding “acts which are prejudicial 
only in a remote or indirect sense . . . . [T]his article does not include . . . distant 
effects.”95 There must be “a reasonably direct and palpable connection between 
                                                                                                                     
found in state and local codes assimilated to the military through a separate federal statute. 
See MORRIS, supra note 13, at 88. Given that this clause simply allows the military to charge 
civilian crimes—which presumably have already passed First Amendment muster on the 
civilian side of the house—this clause is not further discussed. 
 91 See Ackroyd, supra note 77, at 270–71 (tracing the British and early American 
history of Article 134); see also WINTHROP, supra note 33, at 720 (describing its inclusion 
in earlier British codes and noting its Swedish roots in the 1621 code of Gustavus Adolphus 
(Gustavus II). Article 16 of that code punished, “[w]hatsoever is not contained in these 
Articles, and is repugnant to Military Discipline, or whereby the miserable and innocent 
country may against all right and reason be burdened withal”). While a rare configuration of 
this clause, the MCM provides that a “breach of custom of the service” is also a clause one 
violation; customs of the service are defined as those “aris[ing] out of long established 
practices which by common usage have attained the force of law in the military or other 
community affected by them.” MCM, supra note 22, at Pt. IV, ¶ 60.b.(2)(b). 
 92 See Ackroyd, supra note 77, at 271–72, 274. 
 93 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1958) 
 94 See United States v. Guardado, 77 M.J. 90, 95 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (finding Article 134 
cannot be applied to conduct reached by Articles 80 through 132). See generally WINTHROP, 
supra note 33, at 720 n. 64, 725 (explaining that this provision long was designed “to provide 
a general remedy for wrongs not elsewhere provided for”). This prevents Article 134 from 
being abused by using it to punish other UCMJ crimes for which the government is lacking 
evidence of a material element. See MCM, supra note 22, at Pt. IV, ¶ 60.c.(5)(a). 
 95 MCM, supra note 22, at Pt. IV, ¶ 60.c.(2)(a); see, e.g., United States v. Priest, 45 
C.M.R. 338, 343 (C.M.A. 1972) (“From its beginning, this Court has construed 
Article 134 . . . as requiring punishable conduct to be ‘palpably prejudicial to good order and 
discipline, and not merely prejudicial in an indirect and remote sense.’” (quoting United 
States v. Snyder, 4 C.M.R. 15, 18 (C.M.A. 1952))). 
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the speech and the military mission or military environment,”96 though the 
actual harm to such mission or environment need not have already occurred.97 
While the MCM clearly requires a relatively close causal connection 
between the behavior at issue and the required resulting harm for clause one 
offenses, the MCM fails to define the harm itself, leaving one to guess as to 
what is conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.98 In his hoary treatise, 
Winthrop dismissively claims such prejudice is “so familiar to military persons 
that it hardly need be explained,” but then explains that prejudice is “the sense 
of detriment, depreciation or an injuriously affecting.”99 This criminal harm 
indeed can be explained, and indeed must be explained to withstand 
constitutional scrutiny when speech is at issue. Article 134 was designed to 
punish behavior that injures or degrades the maintenance of an environment of 
strict obedience to orders: “[a] crime, therefore, to be cognizable by a court-
martial under this Article, must have been committed under such circumstances 
as to have directly offended against the government and discipline of the 
military state.”100  
While the term “discipline” has varied meanings depending on context, 
discipline in Article 134’s clause one refers to a bedrock organizational and 
operational feature that the U.S. military, like its European forefathers, has long 
depended on for efficient functioning as military affairs increased in 
complexity.101 Considered “the soul of the Army” by George Washington, in 
this context discipline primarily refers to control of a military unit attained 
through the obedience of military members to orders.102 It includes the more 
general sense that services members are doing, and will do, what they are 
                                                                                                                     
 96 United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 449 (C.A.A.F. 2008). 
 97 See United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344 (C.M.A. 1972) (“[T]he danger 
resulting from an erosion of military morale and discipline is too great to require that 
discipline must already have been impaired before a prosecution for uttering statements can 
be sustained.”). Further, no actual prejudice needs to have resulted regarding conduct other 
than speech. See United States v. Johnson, 39 M.J. 1033, 1037 (A.C.M.R. 1994) (“Some acts 
are inherently prejudicial to good order and discipline or discrediting to the service.”) 
(internal citations omitted). But see Friess, supra note 19, at 21 (arguing that United States 
v. Sadinsky, 34 C.M.R. 343 (C.M.A. 1964) established that actual prejudice must be proven 
for Article 134(1) misconduct). 
 98 MCM, supra note 22, at Pt. IV, ¶ 60.c.(2)(a). 
 99 WINTHROP, supra note 33, at 723. 
 100 Id. at 723–24. 
 101 See Ackroyd, supra note 77 at 268 (“War was an immensely complicated 
affair . . . [t]he maintenance of effective disciplinary control in this rough era—the one factor 
that distinguished an army . . . from a mere mob of bandits, plunderers, and potential 
deserters was a difficulty and exacting task.”); see also Dunlap, supra note 24, at 242 (noting 
that discipline has always helped to ensure soldiers kill on demand). 
 102 George Washington, Instructions to Company Captains, FOUNDERS ONLINE (July 29,  
1757), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/02-04-02-0223  
[http://perma.cc/Y67F-YF6F]. 
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expected to do, and discipline also refers to the overall cohesiveness and well-
being of a unit.103  
As to what constitutes action sufficiently harmful to good order and 
discipline to make it criminal, case law reveals that the military has considered 
a vast amount of behavior to suffice, from cross-dressing, to indecent language, 
to drunkenness.104 In United States v. Priest, CAAF concluded that speech that 
“directly affect[s] the capacity of the Government to discharge its 
responsibilities” by “undermin[ing] the effectiveness of response to command” 
would be violative of Article 134’s good order and discipline clause.105 The 
Court also pointed to the “erosion of military morale and discipline” as part of 
the gravamen of this crime.106  
In ascertaining whether speech is sufficiently harmful to good order and 
discipline to violate Article 134, the Supreme Court in Parker v. Levy explained 
that the military’s “unwritten law or usage” had long supplied substance to 
Article 134.107 In addition to this “military members know it when they see it” 
type explanation of the harm required, the Priest Court also pointed to the 
MCM’s listing, by order of the President, of numerous examples of offenses 
considered prejudicial to good order and discipline and/or service-
discrediting.108 Because of these illustrations109 as well as military custom, the 
Parker Court concluded that military members were indeed on notice of what 
behavior is criminally harmful under Article 134 clause one.110  
                                                                                                                     
 103 See Ackroyd, supra note 77, at 269; see also WINTHROP, supra note 33, at 723 
(providing that “good order” is “highly analogous to discipline” in that it may be regarded 
as “referring mainly to the order, i.e.—condition of tranquility, security and good 
government—of the military”). 
 104 See United States v. Guerrero, 33 M.J. 295, 296–97 (C.M.A. 1991) (upholding 
conviction of navy senior enlisted member for violations of both clauses of Article 134 for 
cross-dressing in his apartment and in his car; cross-dressing used by the Court in an 
ignorant, heteronormative sense). For more on cross-dressing as speech, see Bennett Capers, 
Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 1, 6 (2008) (“Clothing, after all, 
is communication: something that can be said, something that can be understood, something 
that can be read.”). See also WINTHROP, supra note 33, at 723 (highlighting that drunkenness 
has long been chargeable as prejudicial to good order and discipline); United States v. 
Trempe, No. 201600150, 2017 WL 411110, at *3 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (upholding 
Article 134, clause one, indecent language conviction). 
 105 United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344 (C.M.A. 1972). 
 106 Id. More will be said in Part IV as to the standards for assessing the constitutionality 
of Article 134 when used to criminalize speech. 
 107 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 748 (1974) (citing Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 
553, 562 (1897)). 
 108 Priest, 45 C.M.R. at 338–39. 
 109 The MCM’s illustrations are sample charge-sheet specifications non-exhaustively 
listing various offenses that can be charged under Article 134. See generally United States 
v. Davis, 27 C.M.R. 908, 908 (1958) (“It is not always easy to tell what act fits in this 
category but one indication is the listing of the offense in the table of maximum punishments 
and the existence of a model specification in the Manual.”).  
 110 Parker, 417 U.S. at 756. What the Parker Court failed to notice is that the majority 
of these exemplar crimes are identical to crimes in most states, though their civilian 
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b. Defining “of a Nature to Bring Discredit upon the Armed Forces” 
In his 1915 State of the Union Address, President Wilson, the most speech 
and press suppressive president in history to date, lamented that “[t]here are 
citizens of the United States . . . who have poured the poison of disloyalty into 
the very arteries of our national life; who have sought to bring the authority and 
good name of our Government into contempt.”111 To deal with such disloyalty, 
he urged Congress to “enact such laws at the earliest possible moment and feel 
that in doing so I am urging you to do nothing less than save the honor and self-
respect of the nation. Such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be 
crushed out.”112  
Only a few months later, Congress amended Article 134 to criminalize “all 
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.”113 In the days 
following, Congress passed the 1917 Espionage Act, which criminalized, inter 
alia, “wilfully caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause insubordination, disloyalty, 
mutiny, refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States” as 
well as “wilfully obstruct[ing] the recruiting or enlistment service of the United 
States, to the injury of the service or of the United States.”114 Congress quickly 
amended this Act by also, inter alia, criminalizing speech “disloyal, profane, 
scurrilous, or abusive” to the armed forces, or that bringing the armed forces 
into “disrepute.”115 The similarity between this now-discredited affront to the 
First Amendment and the 1916 addition to Article 134 is striking. While 
Congress repealed the former in 1920, Article 134’s service-discrediting crime 
remains, a vestigial reminder of our country’s shameful history of suppressing 
speech in the name of national security.116 
Regarding what this crime means today, the MCM doesn’t help much, only 
providing that “discredit means to injure the reputation of . . . 134 makes 
                                                                                                                     
counterparts lack the element of prejudice to good order and discipline. Part V, infra, argues 
that most Article 134 crimes, clause one and two, should be their own stand-alone crimes 
minus the prejudice element. 
 111 Woodrow Wilson, State of the Union, AM. HIST. FROM REVOLUTION TO 
RECONSTRUCTION & BEYOND (Dec. 7, 1915), http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/woodrow 
-wilson/state-of-the-union-1915.php [https://perma.cc/B4QJ-HFL8]. 
 112 Id. 
 113 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1958). The ostensible reason given by the military at the time was 
to allow the military to punish retired enlisted members for service-discrediting acts such as 
failing to pay debts; yet by the following year the military itself had retreated from that 
supposed justification. See Ackroyd, supra note 77, at 275–77 (highlighting legislative 
history and tracing MCM explanations for this new clause); see also E.R. FIDELL ET AL., 
MILITARY JUSTICE: CASES AND MATERIALS 569–70 (2012). 
 114 Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
792-794 (2006)) [hereinafter Espionage Act]. 
 115 The Sedition Act of 1918 (Pub. L. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553, enacted May 16, 1918). 
 116 See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: 
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERROR 230 (2004) (discussing different 
parts of history in which the U.S. government suppressed speech in the name of national 
security).  
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punishable conduct which has a tendency to bring the service into disrepute or 
which tends to lower it in public esteem.”117 Tendency and not actual discredit 
is prohibited.118 While the military courts have at times required public 
awareness of both the conduct at issue and the actor’s military status for conduct 
to be service-discrediting, this awareness was only required in cases in which 
the malfeasance was not otherwise criminal in civilian jurisdictions, such as 
cross-dressing,119 adultery,120 and possessing a needle and syringe.121 Critically, 
recently CAAF clarified that, “evidence that the public was actually aware of 
the misconduct is not necessarily required… proof of the conduct itself may be 
sufficient…that, under all the circumstances, it was of a nature to bring discredit 
upon the armed forces.”122 Furthermore, while CAAF also recently found that 
the military courts’ long practice of finding certain conduct per se discrediting 
was unconstitutional, in that very same case it seemingly continued to do just 
that regarding Article 134 child pornography possession.123 
III. DANGEROUS SPEECH  
There is a wide gulf between the jurisprudential standards utilized to 
determine the constitutionality of criminal laws restricting civilian speech and 
those used to muzzle military members. This variance stems from the Court’s 
characterization of the military as a “specialized society separate from civilian 
                                                                                                                     
 117 MCM, supra note 22, at Pt. IV, ¶ 60.c.(3); see also MORRIS, supra note 13, at 86. It 
provides no further explanation except to state that violations of foreign law or of a local 
jurisdiction may only be punished under the clause if service-discrediting. 
 118 See generally United States v. Hartwig, 39 M.J. 125, 130 (C.M.A. 1994) (concluding 
that actual damage to military’s reputation is not required to convict as service-discrediting). 
Conduct charged under Article 134 must be evaluated in its entire context: the time, place, 
circumstances, and purpose. See United States v. Guerrero, 33 M.J. 295, 298 (C.M.A. 1991). 
 119 Guerrero, 33 M.J. at 297–98 (finding that cross-dressing is not inherently service-
discrediting). 
 120 United States v. Green 39 M.J. 606, 609 (C.M.R 1994) (finding a guilty plea to 
service-discrediting adultery improvident because no public awareness of the act). 
 121 United States v. Caballero, 49 C.M.R. 594, 597 (C.M.A. 1975) (setting aside the 
conviction based on the Article 134 clause two offense for failure to show service-
discrediting nature of possession of narcotics paraphernalia on base with no public awareness 
of same); cf. United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 451 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (holding that all 
protected speech charged as service-discrediting must have a “reasonably direct and palpable 
effect on the military mission or military environment”). 
 122 United States v. Phillips, 70 M.J. 161, 163, 166 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (“In general, the 
government is not required to present evidence that anyone witnessed or became aware of 
the conduct. Nor is the government required to specifically articulate how the conduct is 
service discrediting.”). 
 123 Id. at 167–68 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority correctly held that a 
conclusive presumption of discrediting was unconstitutional while also noting that in effect 
that’s what the court did). Contra United States v. Falk, 50 M.J. 385, 394 (C.A.A.F. 1999) 
(finding that possession of 126 computer images of child pornography on a personal 
computer in government housing on a military post is per se service-discrediting conduct).  
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society” whose effective functioning requires greater limits; “the different 
character of the military community and of the military mission requires a 
different application of those protections.”124 To explore this gulf, this Part 
initially zooms out to sketch the Court’s general approach to the 
constitutionality of speech, and then zooms in on the Espionage and Sedition 
Acts-era cases, given that the military speech doctrine’s roots are buried in such 
early incitement law jurisprudence.  
A. Tiered Speech and First Amendment Armor  
The First Amendment speech clause is generally understood today to 
prohibit governmental suppression of speech animated by governmental dislike 
of the message conveyed. The right to free expression “is designed and intended 
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting 
the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of 
us.”125 Given that laws may adversely burden speech, yet motivated by 
legitimate purposes unrelated to its content, the Supreme Court has bifurcated 
governmental action into content-based and content-neutral. The former—
government regulation of speech based on its “its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content”—is “presumptively invalid,”126 and will only be upheld 
in the rare case that it passes strict scrutiny.127  
Content-neutral laws—government regulations that incidentally burden 
speech, but are not content-based—must meet a less-demanding First 
                                                                                                                     
 124 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 758 (1974); see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 
U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (discussing the special nature of the military life); Orloff v. 
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (“The military constitutes a specialized community 
governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian.”); United States v. Brown, 45 
M.J. 389, 395–96 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (“Both military servicemembers and civilians have the 
right to criticize the Government and to express ideas to influence the body politic . . . . There 
is a difference between the rights of a civilian and the rights of a servicemember when it 
comes to free speech.”). 
 125 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). The term “speech” includes verbal and 
written communication, as well as expressive conduct, which is often referred to as 
“symbolic speech.” See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400, 404 (1989); see also Police 
Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”). 
 126 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 384 n.4 (1992). 
 127 That is, such regulation of speech will only be upheld if it is found to be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Simon & Shuster v. N.Y. Crime 
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (finding that the statute is inconsistent with the First 
Amendment because the Son of Sam law is not narrowly tailored to advance the objective 
of compensating victims from the fruits of crime); see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25–26 (2015) (finding that the ban on providing material support, even 
to the non-violent endeavors, of terrorist organizations is within the scope of the First 
Amendment because the statute is narrowly tailored to prohibit material support, not pure 
political speech, advocacy or expression).  
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Amendment test.128 While they do not face strict scrutiny, content-neutral 
regulations also trigger heightened judicial concerns regarding potential 
vagueness and overbreadth issues.129 Not only can overly-ambiguous laws that 
impact speech inhibit the free expression of otherwise protected speech out of 
uncertainty regarding the laws’ contours, overly-broad laws can sweep into their 
ambit both speech that the Court allows to be restricted, as well as that the First 
Amendment protects.130  
While content-neutral laws are often found constitutional, content-based 
regulations run counter to the First Amendment’s core purpose, and are 
therefore typically invalidated. The government must clear a high hurdle of 
presumptive invalidity to maintain content-based restrictions on speech,131 one 
erected due to the Supreme Court’s recognition that content-based speech 
regulations often seek “to suppress unpopular ideas or information or 
manipulate the public debate through coercion.”132 The Court has found that “it 
is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds 
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government;” 
hence content-based government regulation will only stand in exceptional 
circumstances.133 “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
                                                                                                                     
 128 If government regulation has another purpose unrelated to content—is content-
neutral—yet incidentally burdens speech, such “time, place or manner” restrictions are 
constitutionally permissible as long as they “are justified without reference to the content of 
the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.” McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2016) (quoting Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non–
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (“We have, however, afforded the government 
somewhat wider leeway to regulate features of speech unrelated to its content.”). 
 129 The Court polices vague laws that regulate speech out of fear that such laws “will 
chill constitutionally protected speech.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 988–89 (5th ed. 2015) (“[T]he Court has made it clear that greater 
precision is required when laws regulate speech.”). 
 130 See Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) 
(“Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, an individual whose own speech or 
conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a statute on its face “because it also 
threatens others not before the court—those who desire to engage in legally protected 
expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to 
have the law declared partially invalid.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 129, at 988–90; see 
also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (quoting Grayned v. City 
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)) (“Because appellants’ claims are rooted in the First 
Amendment, they are entitled to rely on the impact of the ordinance on the expressive 
activities of others as well as their own. ‘Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter 
privileged activit[ies], our cases firmly establish appellant’s standing to raise 
an overbreadth challenge.’”).  
 131 See Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).  
 132 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
 133 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See, e.g., 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2015) (finding that the content-based 
application of the federal material support to terrorism statute is constitutional). 
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Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”134 
Despite this sober recognition that speech is integral to robust public debate 
necessary for democratic rule,135 the Court has extended First Amendment 
protections unevenly. It has divided the world into types of speech deserving of 
greater and lesser protections; the latter consists of types of speech “of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”136 
Hence the government is relatively free to regulate such low-value speech based 
on its content, with no presumption of invalidity that would typically apply to 
content-based laws.137 While a spectrum of low to high-valued speech seems to 
exist,138 the Court’s protective schema is traditionally viewed as a bifurcation of 
the speech arena into two classes—protected versus unprotected speech, with 
the latter sub-divided into specific categories.139  
The Court in 2010 highlighted five such categories of unprotected speech: 
obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to crime.140 The 
Stevens majority noted that these categories have long been recognized as one 
                                                                                                                     
 134 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 
359–60 (2003). 
 135 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948) (arguing that there are two different freedoms of speech under the 
Constitution); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT (1995) (discussing issues of the public forum and its arbitration of distinctions 
between the social domains of democracy and management). Other theories have been cited 
as animating the First Amendment, such as those involving personal autonomy, self-
fulfillment and truth-seeking, in addition to sustaining democratic participation. See Schauer, 
supra note 7, at 1784–87; see also C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom 
of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990–92 (1978). 
 136 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 137 However, the Court has made clear that the government cannot engage in content-
based regulation of unprotected speech in a way that regulates some, but not all, of that 
category of speech. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (invalidating 
an ordinance that only banned certain types of fighting words and not others). 
 138 Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 
2170 (2015) (“Much of modern First Amendment jurisprudence is organized around a two-
tier structure that in practice has devolved into more than two tiers.”). This spectrum of lesser 
versus greater protected speech is not a strict duality because the definitions of the types of 
less-protected speech are often controversial. 
 139 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 129, at 975 (“The Supreme Court has declared that some 
types of expression are unprotected and may be prohibited and punished.”). 
 140 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (listing these five categories 
as “historic and traditional”). However, the Stevens Court also found that “[m]aybe there are 
some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been 
specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law . . . .We need not foreclose the 
future recognition of such additional categories.” Id. at 472. Traditionally, so-called “fighting 
words” have also been considered their own unprotected category. See CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 129, at 1036, 1053–54 (also noting that the Court has not upheld a fighting words 
conviction since its 1942 Chaplinksy decision). 
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of a “few limited areas” in which speech restrictions are permissible under the 
First Amendment, implying that newly-proposed unprotected categories 
without such historic lineage are not viable.141 Yet the categorical boundaries of 
such types of speech are not clear-cut, leaving room to potentially expand the 
speech integral to crime exception, for example.142 Additionally, some types of 
speech have been given less than full First Amendment protection, while not 
falling into a fully unprotected category; commercial speech receives 
intermediate, not strict, scrutiny when it is the subject of content-based laws,143 
and various privacy laws punishing seemingly otherwise-protected speech have 
been upheld by lower courts against First Amendment challenges.144  
Military speech crimes do not fit neatly into the Court’s First Amendment 
template. A few military speech crimes seem to fall clearly into the speech 
integral to crime exception, as explained in Part V. Yet instead of using that 
categorical exception, the military courts, with the Supreme Court’s approval, 
have broadly utilized an old version of the Court’s approach to incitement to 
uphold content-based restrictions of otherwise-protected speech as “dangerous” 
speech undeserving of First Amendment protection for over forty years. The 
how and the why to this approach go back to the early part of the twentieth 
century, to which this Article now turns. 
B. Military Speech Doctrine & The Espionage and Sedition Acts  
The military’s highest appellate court has been the lead drafter of today’s 
military speech doctrine, declaring that a military member’s speech is 
unprotected if it either falls into one of the traditionally unprotected categories 
of speech, such as defamation or obscenity, or if it “interferes with or prevents 
the orderly accomplishment of the mission or presents a clear danger to loyalty, 
discipline, mission, or morale of the troops.”145 This military speech doctrine 
                                                                                                                     
 141 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–70 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 
U.S. 803, 817 (2000) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend 
only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and 
benefits.”).  
 142 See Lakier, supra note 138, at 2204–07 (noting that the definition of obscenity has 
long been a matter of debate). 
 143 See Central Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) 
(concluding that the “Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech 
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression”). Scholars also note that the Court has 
deemed “some types of sexually oriented speech” to be of low value. See, e.g., 
CHEMERINKSY, supra note 129, at 1037. 
 144 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 
1069 (2000). See generally Koppelman, supra note 49, at 666 (noting that the tort of 
disclosure of private facts has long been upheld by the lower courts). 
 145 United States v. Brown, 45 M.J. 389, 395 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (plurality opinion) 
(upholding the convictions of African American soldiers for so-called unionizing activity, to 
wit, organizing a gripe session during national guard active duty training and helping 
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has direct links to the 1917–1918 Espionage and Sedition Acts. First, the 
doctrine’s prong criminalizing speech that “interferes with or prevents the 
orderly accomplishment of the mission” riffs directly from the original text of 
the Espionage Act itself.146 Passed two months after the United States entered 
World War I to primarily protect military secrets and punish espionage,147 the 
Espionage Act made it a crime to “willfully make . . . false statements with 
intent to interfere” with U.S. military success or to promote the success of its 
enemies.148 Today’s military speech doctrine drops the willful intent and falsity 
requirements without consideration of their utility, finding unprotected simply 
any speech that interferes with or prevents mission accomplishment.149 While 
the military court has never admitted the Act was its inspiration, the court’s 
recognition of such a sweeping rationale justifying the criminal suppression of 
speech should immediately raise the hackles of those familiar with that Act’s 
excesses.  
Beyond this general cautionary note, another linkage exists between 
military speech crimes and the largely repugnant Espionage-Sedition Act. When 
the Sedition Act amended the Espionage Act in 1918, it went beyond the original 
Act’s prohibition of willful interference with military mission and the draft to 
expressly target those who, in time of war, criticize the government, the flag, 
the military, or the Constitution.150 As noted in Part II.C.2, it also specifically 
criminalized expression that would bring the military into “disrepute”—an 
                                                                                                                     
organize trips home for fellow soldiers). The dissent notes that white soldiers received non-
judicial punishment for the same conduct. Id. at 402 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).  
 146 Compare Brown, 45 M.J. at 395, with Espionage Act § 3, 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (2012). 
 147 Sections 1 and 2 of the Espionage Act, formally Public Law 24, enacted June 15, 
1917, prohibited, as the modern Espionage Act does today, obtaining national defense 
information “with intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used 
to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation” as well as sharing 
the same with those with a “reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury or the United 
States or to the advantage of a foreign nation.” Espionage Act, Pub. L. No. 24, §§ 1–3, 40 
Stat. 217, 217–20 (1917) (amended 1918) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–98 (2012) 
and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2384–90 (2012)). 
 148 Espionage Act § 3, 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (2012). The Espionage Act also punished those 
who, when the United States was at war, “willfully cause[d] or attempt[ed] to cause 
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the 
United States, or . . . willfully obstruct[ed] the recruiting or enlistment service of the United 
States.” Id. This provision remains good law. 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (2012). 
 149 Brown, 45 M.J. at 395. Congress was concerned about the Act’s impact on freedom 
of speech and press, and attempted to narrowly cabin the original statute to address such 
concerns. See generally STONE, supra note 116, at 152 (noting that Congress struck two 
provisions from the original text of the statute due to freedom of expression and press 
concerns). 
 150 Again at the urging of the Wilson Administration, Congress modified the Espionage 
Act to become a full-throttle prohibition of political dissent, indeed, the “most repressive 
legislation in American history.” STONE, supra note 116, at 185. See Sedition Act, ch. 75, 
sec. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 553, 553 (1918). 
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almost identical offense to the 1916 military crime prohibiting “all conduct of a 
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.”151  
Turning to the third and most important connection between the Espionage-
Sedition Act and the military speech doctrine, the military speech doctrine’s 
“clear danger” prong stems directly from the Supreme Court’s early 
jurisprudence dealing with Espionage-Sedition Acts prosecutions.152 This 
historical connection between early seditious advocacy jurisprudence and the 
CAAF-developed, Supreme Court-approved jurisprudential approach to 
suppression of military member speech is not merely an interesting observation. 
Rather, this elucidation of where and how the military speech doctrine’s 
genealogy took a definitive off-ramp from the Court’s much greater 
development of incitement as an unprotected category of speech reveals flaws 
in the military speech doctrine itself.153  
C. Why Brandenburg: The Clearly Present Bad Tendency to Punish 
Remote and Speculative Harm While Inferring Intent 
1. Bad Tendency Test 
The victims of Espionage and Sedition Acts prosecutions encountered a 
federal judiciary quite hostile to First Amendment speech claims.154 Prior to this 
the courts, following Blackstonian notions of the First Amendment as merely 
prohibiting prior restraints, had long borrowed the “bad tendency test” from 
common law attempt crime jurisprudence to deal with speech claims.155 The two 
prongs of the bad tendency test were similar to common law attempt law in its 
                                                                                                                     
 151 The Sedition Act amendment furthermore prohibited all speech opposing “the cause 
of the United States” or supporting that of its enemies. Sedition Act § 3. 
 152 Friess, supra note 19, at 19–20. While scholars writing about military speech 
jurisprudence of course cite Schenck and Dennis when noting CAAF’s approach to First 
Amendment speech challenges, they surprisingly fail to even as much as note that these 
earlier decisions were fatally flawed and have been effectively, though not formally, 
overruled. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 18, at 764. Instead, the few modern academic 
treatments of military speech, as well as CAAF’s jurisprudence itself, cite Schenck and 
Dennis with seeming pride, instead of the revulsion they warrant. See, e.g., id. 
 153 The defects are easily recognizable, as they are those the Court worked hard to 
improve in its post-Schenck and post-Dennis doctrinal refinements. The Court’s later 
improvements are those the highly deferential Rehnquist Court in 1974 implied were not 
needed in the military context. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758–59 (1974). 
 154 See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 15 (1977).  
 155 See id. at 2; see also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 458–59, 463 (1906) 
(upholding newspaper journalist’s contempt conviction for articles and cartoons criticizing 
judges in a pending case, the Court explained that the First Amendment did not prohibit 
criminal punishment of speech already uttered based on its tendency to cause harm because: 
“if a court regards, as it may, a publication concerning a matter of law pending before it, as 
tending toward such an interference, it may punish it as in the instance put”) (emphasis 
added); STONE, supra note 116, at 171–73 (explaining the embrace of the bad tendency test 
by the federal courts to uphold Espionage Act convictions during World War I). 
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requirements of both a specific intent to commit a crime, along with an act 
sufficient to show that the criminal result was the natural outcome.156 In the 
translation to speech cases, attempt law’s acts became speculative and remote 
tendencies of harm, and specific intent inferentially merged with that same 
tendency. The result was a collapse of the test into one judicial guess as to 
whether the speech at issue could potentially cause the particular harm the given 
statute was ostensibly trying to prevent.   
Applied to the Espionage Act, convictions required proof both that the 
defendant possessed a non-express criminal intent, and that his language had a 
“natural and reasonably probable tendency” to cause unlawful harm.157 
Exemplary of the latter prong, the Ninth Circuit in Shaffer v. United States 
upheld an Espionage Act conviction for mailing a book critical of the war by 
asking, “whether the natural and probable tendency and effect of the words . . . 
are such as are calculated to produce the result condemned by statute.”158 
Despite admitting that disapproval of the war was not a crime, the court of 
appeals found that “the question here is . . . whether the natural and probable 
tendency and effect of the words quoted therefrom are such as are calculated to 
produce the result condemned by the statute.”159 Similar to the military courts’ 
later reasoning, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that since criticizing the war as 
wrong could weaken patriotism and the desire to serve in the military, 
criminalizing such a book was non-problematic.160 
                                                                                                                     
 156 See David R. Dow & R. Scott Shieldes, Rethinking the Clear and Present Danger 
Test, 73 IND. L.J. 1217, 1222 (1998); see also STONE, supra note 116, at 174–76 (discussing 
how most Espionage Act convictions were for attempted obstructions, and how the courts 
skirted common law attempt’s specific intent requirement by allowing “constructive intent”). 
 157 Brief for the United States at 75–77, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (No. 
714, reprinted in 19 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 680 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 
1975) (noting that Espionage Act convictions required proof both that the defendant 
possessed a “specific, willful, criminal intent” and that his language had “a natural and 
reasonably probable tendency” to cause unlawful harm). 
 158 Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886, 887–88 (9th Cir. 1919) (upholding conviction 
for mailing a book containing several treasonable, disloyal, and seditious utterances, 
explaining that “[t]o teach that patriotism is murder and the spirit of the devil, and that the 
war against Germany was wrong and its prosecution a crime, is to weaken patriotism and the 
purpose to enlist or to render military service in the war”); see also Goldstein v. United 
States, 258 F. 908, 910–11 (9th Cir. 1919) (upholding an Espionage Act conviction and 
stating “circumstances surrounding [speech] . . . may well tend to show whether the [speech] 
would naturally, in the light of great events, be calculated to foment disloyalty or 
insubordination among the naval or military forces”); Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 
24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917) (“If the natural and reasonable effect of what is said is to encourage 
resistance to a law, and the words are used in an endeavor to persuade to resistance, it is 
immaterial that the duty to resist is not mentioned, or the interest of the persons addressed in 
resistance is not suggested.”). 
 159 Shaffer, 255 F. at 887. 
 160 Id. at 888. 
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Most concerning, courts of this era provided no temporal or other yardstick 
to determine such tendencies, instead rubber-stamping convictions involving 
quite speculative and remote harm based on war hysteria, bias, and 
discrimination.161 Adding fuel to the bad tendency test’s book-burning fire was 
the courts’ practice of allowing juries to presume that defendants intended the 
natural and probable consequences of their actions—instead of requiring the 
government to actually prove such specific intent.162 This presumption conflated 
the test’s two prongs, guaranteeing convictions once speech’s tendency to harm 
was established; in other words, speakers could be punished for unrealized third 
party action that potentially could be caused by their speech.163 Given that the 
Espionage Act prohibited broad and nebulous activities such as attempting to 
sow disloyalty and insubordination amongst the troops—rather similar to the 
equally broad Articles 133 and 134 crimes—allowing the requisite intent to be 
inferred from the speech’s speculative “natural and reasonable effect” permitted 
broad government suppression of disfavored speech in the World War I period 
of hysteria.164  
2. Clear and Present Danger Is Bad Tendency 
The above discussion notes the flaws of the speech-suppressive bad 
tendency test because this same flawed test is the core of today’s military speech 
doctrine, one that possesses the same speculative harm and intent defects. The 
logically-bankrupt bad tendency test survived in the military context because 
the military appellate court simply turned to the Supreme Court’s famous 1919 
                                                                                                                     
 161 See id. Shaffer exemplified how appellate courts speculatively concluded that 
unpatriotic speech had a tendency to harm the draft or troop loyalty:  
Printed matter may tend to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service, even if it 
contains no mention of recruiting or enlistment, and no reference to the military service 
of the United States . . . [t]he service may be obstructed by attacking the justice of the 
cause for which the war is waged, and by undermining the spirit of loyalty which 
inspires men to enlist . . . . The greatest inspiration for entering into such service is 
patriotism, the love of country. To teach that patriotism is murder . . . and that the war 
against Germany was wrong and its prosecution a crime, is to weaken patriotism and 
the purpose to enlist or to render military service in the war.  
Id. 
 162 Dow & Shieldes, supra note 156, at 1222. The speaker “must be presumed to have 
intended the natural and probable consequences of what he knowingly did.” Shaffer, 255 F. 
at 889. This presumption drew upon common law “natural and probable consequences” 
doctrine. See e.g., RABBAN, supra note 154, at 2. 
 163 See Dow & Shieldes, supra note 156, at 1222–23 (noting that the bad tendency 
approach treated speech as an act, and evaluating speech effects was simply a matter of 
asking “whether it was reasonable to assume that certain ill effects would follow”); see also 
STONE, supra note 116, at 215 (“[F]ederal courts routinely conflated these two elements and 
allowed juries to infer criminal intent from bad tendency.”). 
 164 See STONE, supra note 116, at 230–31. 
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decision in Schenck v. United States,165 the Court’s first Espionage Act case, 
and uncritically adopted its approach.166 Schenck’s “clear and present danger” 
test to whether speech can be criminalized consistent with the First Amendment 
was simply the bad tendency test by another name.167 
The unanimous Schenck Court upheld petitioners’ convictions for 
conspiracy to distribute pamphlets “calculated to cause . . . insubordination” in 
the military and obstruction of the draft.168 In doing so, Justice Holmes agreed 
with the lower courts’ bad tendency approach; he inferred the requisite intent to 
cause insubordination and obstruction through sheer speculation that a potential 
effect of petitioners’ pamphlet was to influence those subject to the draft to 
refuse their orders—this despite that the pamphlet at issue specifically called 
only for lawful draft repeal.169  
While the Schenck analysis tracked the appellate courts’ bad tendency test, 
the opinion is well-known for Justice Holmes’s potentially narrowing language: 
his famous false cry of fire analogy.170 Just as a panic-inducing false cry of fire 
in a theater would not be protected by the First Amendment, the defendants’ 
pamphlet was likewise not protected because, per Justice Holmes’s famous 
language:  
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger 
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.171  
Such a test seemed to call for more than a remote connection between 
speech and harm, yet there was no such immediate danger in Schenk, and the 
conviction was nonetheless upheld—highlighting that this was actually a 
colorful moniker for the extant bad tendency test.172  
                                                                                                                     
 165 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48–49, 53 (1919). 
 166 See United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338, 345–46 (C.M.A. 1972). 
 167 See Schenck, 29 U.S. at 52. 
 168 Id. at 49. Charles T. Schenck, the secretary general of the Socialist Party, and 
Elizabeth Baer were convicted of three counts of violating the Espionage Act in that they 
“willfully conspired to have printed and circulated to men . . . called . . . for military 
service . . . a document set forth and alleged to be calculated to cause . . . insubordination 
and obstruction” and for conspiracy to mail, and actually mailing, the same. Id. 
 169 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51 (“[T]he document would not have been sent unless it had 
been intended to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to 
have upon persons subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it 
out.”). But see STONE, supra note 116, at 192–93 (highlighting the irrationality of this logic). 
 170 See Dow & Shieldes, supra note 156, at 1221. 
 171 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 172 STONE, supra note 116, at 194–95 (discussing the lack of danger in Schenck, and 
pointing out the fallacy even if there was such a danger, given that there may be value to 
speech that outweighs any danger created); see Dow & Shieldes, supra note 156, at 1222–23 
(describing the bad tendency test as “[i]f the act of speech will tend to cause ill effects, then 
the speech is subject to punishment . . . in measuring the potential ill effects of certain 
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That Schenk’s “clear and present danger” language simply was the bad 
tendency approach by another name was made clear in subsequent Espionage 
Act cases. A mere week after Schenck, Justice Holmes again wrote for the 
unanimous Court in Frohwerk v. United States173 and Debs v. United States.174 
The Court did not mention clear and present danger, and instead summarily 
upheld these Espionage Act convictions for dissenting speech.175 In Frohwerk, 
the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy and attempt to cause “disloyalty, 
mutiny and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces” was based on 
newspaper articles protesting the draft and the war.176 In Debs, the Socialist 
Party’s candidate’s conviction for inciting “insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny 
and refusal of duty in the military” as well as for recruitment and enlistment 
obstruction were based on a public speech in which he paid homage to three 
jailed war opponents.177 The speech at issue in both cases, primarily about the 
virtues of socialism, were merely anti-war, again highlighting how the bad 
tendency test allowed speech that was disliked, in this case because it was 
seemingly unpatriotic, to be punished despite no real tendency of harm.178 
3. Clear and Present Danger with Teeth 
It took another fifty years for the Supreme Court to fully cabin clear and 
present danger to its present meaning in Brandenburg.179 While the Court’s 
evolutionary path from Schenk to Brandenburg has been well-tread by scholars 
over the years, this march reveals several points relevant to the military’s 
approach to speech. It highlights the susceptibility of national security speech 
crimes—speech made criminal because of an ostensibly deleterious impact on 
national security—to enormous executive branch overreach via criminalization 
                                                                                                                     
speech, the proper test was to ask simply whether it was reasonable to assume that certain ill 
effects would follow”).  
 173 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (“[T]he First Amendment while 
prohibiting legislation against free speech as such cannot have been, and obviously was not, 
intended to give immunity for every possible use of language.”). 
 174 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919). The Debs Court continued the lower 
courts’ habit requiring specific intent while allowing the jury to infer intent from tendency: 
“if in that speech he used words tending to obstruct the recruiting service he meant that they 
should have that effect.” Id. at 216. 
 175 See id. at 213, 217; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 207–08, 210. 
 176 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 205. Given the derogatory nature in which appellant’s articles 
portrayed the U.S. war efforts, and despite an acknowledgement there was no special attempt 
to reach draft-age men, the Court upheld the convictions based on the mere possibility that 
the articles could negatively affect the military. Id. at 209–10. 
 177 Debs, 249 U.S. at 212.  
 178 See, e.g., STONE, supra note 116, at 208 (“[T]he ‘bad tendency’ test . . . enables the 
government to eliminate almost all criticism . . . .”).  
 179 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (finding that the First 
Amendment does not “permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or 
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”). 
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of speech based on fear, dislike, and paranoia instead of real harm. Additionally, 
this history reveals how the criminal law concepts of intent and causation (via 
imminency) impacted the Court’s analysis, and how such factors can be 
structured to help ensure an appropriate balance between expressive freedom 
and harm prevention. 
The foundation for clear and present danger’s eventual limits are found in 
the famous dissent in Abrams v. United States180 In this Espionage-Sedition Act 
case, the five defendants, enraged by a little-known U.S. Marine Corps 
intervention in Russia, were convicted of encouraging resistance to the United 
States by distributing two leaflets defendants had thrown out of New York City 
windows.181 Justice Holmes, joined in dissent by Justice Brandeis, revisited 
Schenk’s clear and present danger metaphor to find that the defendants’ 
pamphlets were constitutionally protected speech.182 He argued that, unlike the 
bad tendency version of his test, the government needed to prove actual intent 
to cause the anticipated harm, and not simply allow an inference of intent from 
a reasonable tendency to produce such harm.183 Also, instead of Schenck’s clear 
and present danger language, Holmes substituted imminency: “[i]t is only the 
present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants 
Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion.”184  
Though the Espionage Act fell into disuse after World War I, the Court 
continued to work on its speech jurisprudence through speech cases based on 
state criminal anarchy and syndicalism statutes.185 In upholding the 
constitutionality of such Red Scare laws, the Court modified the clear and 
                                                                                                                     
 180 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–29 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 181 STONE, supra note 116, at 205. The pamphlets ridiculed President Wilson; decried 
capitalism as the enemy; urged the “[w]orkers of the [w]orld” to wake up; and warned 
munitions workers that “you are producing bullets . . . to murder not only the Germans, but 
also your dearest, best, who are in Russia.” Abrams, 250 U.S. at 619–21. 
 182 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627–29, 631 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 183 See id. at 627–29. He also highlighted that “the principle of the right to free speech 
is always the same” whether in war or peace, though “war opens dangers that do not exist at 
other times.” Id. at 628. 
 184 Id. at 627–28 (noting that the government can “punish speech that produces or is 
intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain 
substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent” (emphasis 
added)); see also Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 272 (1920) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., 
dissenting) (arguing, inter alia, that some charges against the defendants should be dropped 
because of the lack of evidence as to their intent to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, 
or refusal of duty); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482–83 (1920) (Brandeis & 
Holmes, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that three of the defendants’ convictions should be 
overturned because a rational jury could not find a clear and present danger from the 
evidence). 
 185 See Dow & Shieldes, supra note 156, at 1228–30. Fear of looming World War II 
prompted new prosecutions under the Espionage Act of 1917, such as in United States v. 
Pelley, 132 F.2d 170, 171 (7th Cir. 1942). 
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present danger version of the bad tendency approach.186 The first modification 
was the Court’s 1927 acknowledgment that anarchy laws only criminalized the 
express advocacy of illegality, hinting that the advocacy of lawful opposition 
and change, penalized in the Espionage Act cases, would be constitutionally 
protected.187 Justices Holmes and Brandeis, in contrast, continued to emphasize 
that even if such advocacy is express, the resulting danger must be imminent 
before criminality attaches.188 
Justice Brandeis’s famous concurrence in Whitney v. California, upholding 
a state syndicalism conviction for the formation of a local chapter of the national 
Communist Party, echoed Holmes’s Abrams imminency requirement.189 The 
clear and immediate danger approach, as outlined by these two justices, 
increasingly took hold in the years leading to World War II, with the Court 
largely sustaining First Amendment claims based on the lack of express intent 
and immediate danger.190 By 1942, the bad tendency test was seemingly 
                                                                                                                     
 186 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664–65, 672 (1925) (upholding a 
conviction under New York anarchy statute for publications advocating strikes to bring about 
the end of the state). The Court reasoned that the statute may be appropriately applied to 
specific speech “if its natural tendency and probable effect was to bring about the substantive 
evil which the legislative body might prevent,” and that since New York had already decided 
that advocacy prohibited by its statute would tend to have bad effects, no further inquiry, 
such as a clear and present danger test, was necessary. Id. at 671–72. 
 187 Id. at 664–65 (“The statute . . . does not restrain the advocacy of changes in the form 
of government by constitutional and lawful means. What it prohibits is language advocating, 
advising or teaching the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means.”); see also 
STONE, supra note 116, at 237 (highlighting that this acknowledgment of express advocacy 
resembles Judge Learned Hand’s famous approach in Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 
535, 540–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), an Espionage Act case in which, as trial judge, Judge Hand 
found the speech at issue protected because it did not expressly advocate criminal conduct). 
 188 Noting that there was no imminent danger of a violent government overthrow in 
Gitlow, Justice Holmes famously exclaimed that “[e]very idea is an 
incitement . . . [e]loquence may set fire to reason,” and hence the dividing line for the First 
Amendment must be imminent danger. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., 
dissenting). 
 189 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376–77 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., 
concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per 
curiam) (“[T]he incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before 
there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the 
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be 
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”). In essence, “[o]nly an emergency can justify 
repression.” Id. at 377; see also Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the 
First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1170 
(1982). 
 190 See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947) (overturning a contempt 
conviction stating that “[t]he danger must not be remote or even probable; it must 
immediately imperil”); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943); Bridges 
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) 
(finding that speech can only be restricted when there is “a clear and present danger to a 
substantial interest of the State”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105–06 (1940); 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).  
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replaced by the Whitney/Gitlow Brandeis-Holmes clear and present danger 
standard for determining when speech could be criminally suppressed.191 From 
cases such as Herndon v. Lowry to Bridges v. California, bad tendency was 
seemingly banished, with seriousness of the harm added to the mix: “[w]hat 
finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ cases is a working principle 
that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence 
extremely high before utterances can be punished.”192  
However, the Court retreated from its new insistence on immediate danger 
in its plurality decision in 1951’s Dennis v. United States, a case upholding 
charges of conspiracy to advocate for the forceful overthrow of the government 
under the anti-communism 1940 Smith Act.193 This is critical, because the 
military high appellate court later incorporated the Dennis approach into its 
military speech doctrine, as discussed in Part IV. The Dennis plurality adopted 
the appellate court’s watered-down formulation of the clear and present danger 
test first crafted by Judge Learned Hand: “In each case [courts] must ask 
whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such 
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”194 This severely 
diluted version of clear and present danger functioned as a sliding scale, one 
subject to “ideological manipulation” that ambiguously tried to balance the 
value of the First Amendment against an unclear “danger to society.”195 Under 
                                                                                                                     
 191 See STONE, supra note 116, at 396 (“In the years between 1920 and 1950 . . . the 
Court had increasingly moved toward the Holmes-Brandeis ‘clear and present’ danger 
test.”); id. at 269, 272 (highlighting that by 1942, “criminal prosecutions for expression of 
the sort that were commonplace during World War I were now of doubtful constitutionality, 
if not downright unthinkable . . . the prosecutions in Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs, and Abrams 
were no longer thought consonant with the constitution”).  
 192 Bridges, 314 U.S. at 263 (overturning a contempt conviction); see also Herndon v. 
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263–64 (1937) (overturning conviction under a state anti-insurrection 
statute that “amounts merely to a dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agitates for a 
change of government if a jury can be persuaded that he ought to have foreseen his words 
would have some effect in the future conduct of others”).  
 193 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508–10, 517 (1951). The Smith Act, passed 
in 1940, was another sedition act; it required resident aliens to register with the federal 
government and prohibited persons “knowingly or willfully” to “advocate, abet, advise, or 
teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any 
government in the United States by force or violence.” See id. at 496. The Act was largely 
employed as an anti-communist Cold War tool. See Dow & Shieldes, supra note 156, at 
1224–26 (explaining the Cold War history of this statute). 
 194 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d. 201, 212 (2d 
Cir. 1950)). 
 195 STONE, supra note 116, at 409; see e.g., Redish, supra note 189, at 1171 (noting that 
the Dennis version of clear and present danger was a “dramatic alteration in the test’s 
scope”); id. at 1173 (referring to the Dennis Court’s adoption of the “Hand sliding-scale 
test”). See generally THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 114 
(1970) (concluding that “the Hand-Vinson formula seems to emasculate the clear and present 
danger test”). But see Redish, supra note 189, at 1170 (stating that “[m]ajority recognition 
of the clear and present danger test as a proper way of measuring the protection of free speech 
was some time in coming”).  
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this new approach, “threat of a great evil, even of a non-imminent one, would 
justify suppression of speech.”196  
Regrettably, this new version lacked the Holmes-Brandeis emphasis on both 
immediate and substantive seriousness of harm, creating an inverse relationship 
between these criteria instead of demanding their joint presence.197 The Dennis 
Court justified this by explaining that clear and present danger “cannot mean 
that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be 
executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited.”198 Yet by killing 
the requirement for a tight temporal connection between speech and harm, the 
Court opened the door to speech suppression based on dislike of message versus 
real concern about harm, one the military courts later marched right through.199 
While no prediction of future harm is infallible, the requirement of immediacy 
of the harm—a “close temporal connection between speech and harm”—
improves predictive odds, and further requiring Bridges’ emphasis on high 
probability of serious harm helps ensure that it really is the danger that is 
spurring government suppression, and not simply dislike of the ideas 
expressed.200  
The Brandenburg Court later corrected its huge Dennis misstep.201 While 
the Brandenburg opinion does not mention clear and present danger, the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 196 Redish, supra note 189, at 1172, 1180 (“Ultimately, however, the Dennis Court’s test 
effectively deleted the requirements that the danger be either clear or present when the 
potential harm was severe.”).  
 197 Id. at 1172 (“The Hand test, by contrast, made the variables dependent so that 
probability and gravity of harm would work in inverse correlation: the graver the evil 
threatened by the speech, the less probable need be its occurrence before government is 
justified in suppressing the speech.”).  
 198 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509. 
 199 See STONE, supra note 116, at 409. Instead of clear and present danger, the Court 
was back to the bad tendency approach. See Redish, supra note 189, at 1173 n.71 (citing 
MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 65 
(1966) (“[Dennis] is simply the remote bad tendency test dressed up in modem style.”)).  
 200 STONE, supra note 116, at 409. The Dennis Court was caught up in the McCarthy-
era fear of communism, eventually coming “to regard Dennis as an embarrassment.” Id. at 
410. The Court made a nuanced attempt to distinguish Dennis in Yates v. United States a few 
years later, in which the majority reversed Smith Act convictions quite similar to those 
upheld in Dennis. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 325–26 (1957) (distinguishing 
between advocacy to take action from advocacy to believe in ideas). 
 201 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); see, e.g., Dow & 
Shieldes, supra note 156, at 1234 (noting that Brandenburg has been characterized as “an 
extension of the Holmes/Brandeis refinement of the CPD test”) (citing RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 
FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 115 (1992)); cf. STONE, supra note 116, at 522 (noting 
that Brandenburg “finally and unambiguously embraced the Holmes-Brandeis version of 
clear and present danger”). The Brandenburg Court also noted that “constitutional 
guarantees . . . do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of 
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
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was clearly influenced by the Holmes-Brandeis pre-Dennis formulation.202 
Though it left open the question of how to assess imminence and likelihood of 
the harm, later incitement cases have all required express advocacy of 
immediate violation of the law and a high likelihood of such action; the Court 
has employed this “modern incitement test” to consistently invalidate 
convictions for mere advocacy.203 Because of the susceptibility that the 
Brandeis-Holmes clear and present danger approach could easily devolve into 
an ad hoc cost-benefit analysis, the Brandenburg Court also tethered its rule on 
the distinction made in earlier cases: the difference, in degree of importance 
regarding the purposes of the First Amendment, of high- versus low-value 
speech.204  
The Court had earlier utilized the clear and present danger test to determine 
First Amendment protections in situations outside of advocacy, such as 
regarding fighting words,205 and seemingly left the Holmes-Brandeis test as the 
Brandenburg formulation of incitement.206 However, the clear and present 
danger approach—the worst bad tendency version—did not completely die; it 
lived on in the military speech doctrine, and is long due a silver bullet.  
                                                                                                                     
 202 See David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, 
reprinted in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 57 (Lee C. Bollinger 
& Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (noting that “the Court’s emphasis on imminence and on a 
high probability of harm” flows directly from the Holmes-Brandeis clear and present danger 
approach). 
 203 See, e.g., NAACP v. Caliborne Hardware Co, 458 U.S. 886, 902, 934 (1982) 
(overturning civil judgment against the NAACP for boycott of white-owned businesses 
based in part on statement: “If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we’re 
gonna break your damn neck.” ); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107, 109 (1973) (reversing 
conviction for shout of “[w]e’ll take the fucking street later” at an antiwar demonstration); 
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706, 708 (1969) (reversing conviction of man who 
publicly said, “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is 
L.B.J.”); Dow & Shieldes, supra note 156, at 1234 (noting use of Brandenburg test to 
invalidate convictions for advocacy of violence). 
 204 Strauss, supra note 202, at 56–57 (noting that Brandenburg supplemented its clear 
and present danger approach by emphasizing “the distinction between high- and low-value 
speech”); see also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (citing Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 
297–98 (1961)) (“[T]he mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral 
necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent 
action and steeling it to such action.”). 
 205 Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (describing low-value 
speech as that whose “prevention and punishment . . . have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem”); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 129, at 1054 (noting that the 
Court has narrowed Chaplinksy fighting words to only “speech directed at another person 
that is likely to produce a violence response”). Also, most fighting words convictions have 
not been upheld by the Court since Chaplinksy; such laws have been found to be 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 1055. 
 206 Strauss, supra note 202, at 55–56 (noting that the clear and present danger test 
eclipsed in the 1940s). 
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IV. MILITARY SPEECH DOCTRINE AS DENNIS  
A. Military Speech Doctrine Adoption: Priest and Parker  
In its 1974 decision in Parker v. Levy, the Supreme Court adopted the 
Dennis bad tendency version of the clear and present danger test for use when 
dealing with the military’s ability to punish servicemember speech.207 The 
Court did so by explicitly approving the military appellate court’s approach to 
servicemember speech as outlined by CAAF’s predecessor, the Court of 
Military Appeals (CMA), in United States v. Priest.208 Priest, a 1972 military 
appellate case, which, like Parker, dealt with the military Article 134 crime of 
disloyal statements, established the Parker-Court-approved approach to military 
speech for nearly the next four decades.209  
In Priest, the CMA upheld a conviction for conduct prejudicial to good 
order and discipline for “printing and distributing, with intent to promote 
disloyalty and disaffection among members of the armed forces, issues of a 
publication which, in its entirety, contained statements disloyal to the United 
States.”210 The Priest court expressly rejected the Brandenburg standard for 
determining First Amendment-protected advocacy in the military because “[t]he 
armed forces depend on a command structure that at times must commit men to 
combat.”211 Therefore, speech that falls short of incitement but “undermine[s] 
the effectiveness of response to command” is constitutionally unprotected in the 
military context.212  
The Priest court identified military morale and discipline as integral to 
“response to command,” finding that unlike in the civilian context, in which 
imminency and likelihood of harm are required for speech to be unprotected, 
“the danger resulting from an erosion of military morale and discipline is too 
great to require that discipline must already have been impaired before a 
prosecution for uttering statements can be sustained.”213 Specifically, the court 
found that the success or likelihood of success of the speaker’s dangerous words 
is not required for conviction; instead, quoting Schenck, “[i]f the act (speaking, 
or circulating a paper), its tendency and the intent with which it is done, are the 
same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the 
act a crime.”214 
                                                                                                                     
 207 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760–61 (1974); see also Zillman & Imwinkelried, 
supra note 18, at 408 (“In Levy, Justice Rehnquist adopted the Court of Military Appeals’ 
‘clear and present danger’ test . . . .”). 
 208 United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338 (1972). 
 209 Friess, supra note 19, at 22–23 (highlighting that Priest established the approach 
CAAF would take for decades). 
 210 Priest, 45 C.M.R. at 340. 
 211 Id. at 344. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. at 345 (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). 
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 In other words, the Priest court seemingly held “that even a seemingly 
remote threat to good order and discipline will be sufficient in most instances to 
justify a criminal conviction.”215 In order to determine this speculative harm, or 
in Justice Holmes’s words, “the degree of danger which must exist before” a 
military member’s speech can be punished,216 the Priest court quoted Schenck’s 
clear and present danger language, and approvingly quoted the Dennis re-
formulation of that test.217 Applying it to the appellant’s publications, the Priest 
court specifically asked “whether the gravity of the effect of accused’s 
publications on good order and discipline in the armed forces, discounted by the 
improbability of their effectiveness on the audience he sought to reach, justifies 
his conviction.”218   
Hence, as in the actual Dennis case, the Priest court’s military speech 
doctrine, with the Parker Supreme Court’s imprimatur, was and is simply the 
bad tendency test dressed up in Learned Hand’s eloquence. The military version 
of the bad tendency approach to government punishment of speech even 
includes the bad tendency test’s inference of intent from tendency. For example, 
the Priest court followed the Abrams Court’s lead in finding that, 
Where the accused’s pamphlets suggested means by which the troops might 
actively demonstrate their own disloyalty and disaffection . . . such statements 
permitted an inference of the accused’s intent to promote disloyalty and 
disaffection among the troops from the contents of the pamphlets and their free 
distribution to members of the armed services.219 
By adopting the bad tendency approach to speech suppression cloaked with 
a clear and present danger label, Priest eviscerated the traditional understanding 
that Article 134’s uniquely military crime requires harm that is “palpably 
prejudicial to good order and discipline, and not merely prejudicial in an indirect 
and remote sense.”220 While the Priest court superficially required that 
appellant’s underground newspaper, left for free distribution to military 
members, have a palpably prejudicial impact, in application the court required 
nothing of the sort. It merely speculated that because not all military members 
“have the maturity of judgment to resist propaganda . . . [o]ne possible harm 
from the statements is the effect on others if the impression becomes widespread 
that revolution, smashing the state, murdering policemen, and assassination of 
public officials are acceptable conduct.”221 How this utterly speculative harm to 
                                                                                                                     
 215 Carr, supra note 19, at 323.  
 216 Priest, 45 C.M.R. at 344 (citing United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 429, 437 (1967)). 
 217 Id. (specifically acknowledging Chief Judge Learned Hand in adopting the following 
test: “In each case (courts) must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” 
(quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951))). 
 218 Id. at 344–45. 
 219 Id. at 338. 
 220 Id. at 343 (quoting United States v. Snyder, 4 C.M.R. 15, 18 (C.M.A. 1952)).  
 221 Id. at 345. 
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good order and discipline was anything but remote and indirect is ludicrous—a 
prime example of the failure of rigorous analytical thinking that Justices 
Holmes’s and Brandeis’s requirements of imminent serious harm and intent 
were meant to preclude.222 
Regardless of such flaws, a highly deferential Supreme Court approved the 
CMA’s Priest approach in Parker v. Levy only two years later.223 In Parker, the 
Court upheld an Army captain’s conviction for telling black soldiers that he 
would refuse future orders to go to Vietnam if he was in their position by 
refusing to apply the Brandenburg incitement standard.224 Instead, it shielded 
the two charged military penal provisions from vagueness and overbreadth 
challenges225 by finding that the special nature of the military allows it to be 
“governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian” and hence suppress 
a greater range of speech than is constitutional in the civilian sphere.226  
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Parker Court’s 5-3 majority, deferentially 
relied on military exceptionalism to avoid rigorous legal analysis regarding the 
scope of the First Amendment in the military context.227 While Parker found 
that First Amendment protections apply in the military, the Court concluded that 
such protections apply differently than in the civilian context—without 
                                                                                                                     
 222 The CMA concluded that in order to protect military members from appellant’s 
“purposefully written papers calling for violent and revolutionary action,” his prosecution 
was appropriate, given that his papers’ “publication and distribution tended palpably and 
directly to affect military order and discipline and were punishable under the general article.” 
Priest, 45 C.M.R. at 346. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, ruling in on Priest’s collateral 
attack of his court-martial conviction, concurred that the Article 134 speech crime in Priest’s 
case was constitutionally sound, given that Congress could punish speech which 
“undermine[s] the effectiveness of response” to command by military personnel. Priest v. 
Sec’y of Navy, 570 F.2d 1013, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 
759).  
 223 Parker, 417 U.S. at 758. 
 224 Id. at 735–37. Both Captain Levy’s Article 134 and 133 specifications characterized 
his statements as disloyal; the 134 charge specified that he made the comments “with design 
to promote disloyalty and disaffection among the troops” and the 133 unbecoming charge 
claimed that he “wrongfully and dishonorably” made “statements variously described as 
intemperate, defamatory, provoking, disloyal, contemptuous, and disrespectful.” Id. at 738–
39. 
 225 Dr. Levy was convicted by court-martial, receiving three years’ prison time and a 
dismissal from the Army, and brought a successful habeas petition in the Third Circuit, which 
agreed with him that the “conduct unbecoming” (Article 133) and the “conduct prejudicial 
to good order and discipline” (Article 134) UCMJ provisions were unconstitutional on 
vagueness and overbreadth grounds. See Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 18, at 398 
(noting the procedural posture of the case); see also Murphy, supra note 18, at 777 
(dissecting the Parker Circuit Court opinion and predicting that the Supreme Court would 
“bur[y]” Articles 133 and 134). 
 226 Parker, 417 U.S. at 744 (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953)). 
 227 Cf. Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 18, at 401 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s 
acquiescence in Parker to the society apart justification must be questioned.”). 
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specifying how different the protections could or should be.228 The Court 
rationalized its complaisance by finding that “[t]he fundamental necessity for 
obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may 
render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally 
impermissible outside it.”229    
Citing the need for deference to the military, the Parker Court explicitly 
approved the doctrinal approach to servicemembers’ First Amendment 
protections taken by the CMA in Priest.230 Critically, the Parker Court noted 
that while the challenged penal provisions could be indeterminate at their edges, 
their interpretation by the military appellate court, as well as by military 
tradition, made them sufficiently specific to serve requisite notice.231 Hence, the 
Parker Court let stand the CMA’s test for determining when servicemembers’ 
speech was unprotected: when it posed a “clear and present danger” to 
responsiveness to command.232 
B. Military Speech Doctrine in Application 
The military appellate cases233 that subsequently utilized the military 
speech doctrine established in Priest and approved by the Supreme Court in 
                                                                                                                     
 228 Parker, 417 U.S. at 758. See generally Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial 
and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice II, 72 HARV. L. REV. 266 (1958) (arguing that 
the Bill of Rights originally had no application to the military). 
 229 Parker, 417 U.S. at 758.  
 230 Id. at 759. Parker approvingly quoted CMA’s conclusion that “[s]peech that is 
protected in the civil population may nonetheless undermine the effectiveness of response to 
command. If it does, it is constitutionally unprotected.” Id.  
 231 Id. at 760–61 (noting the “narrowing construction by the United States Court of 
Military Appeals” of the general articles). Regarding the narrowing function of military 
custom and usage, the Court referred to the hoary case of Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65 (1857), 
as recognition that military tradition provides notice of misconduct not specified by law, and 
that such practice “is not liable to abuse; for what those crimes are, and how they are to be 
punished, is well known by practical men in the navy and army.” Parker, 417 U.S. at 747. 
 232 See Parker, 417 U.S. at 758; see also Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 18, at 408 
(“In Levy, Justice Rehnquist adopted the Court of Military Appeals’ ‘clear and present 
danger’ test.”). The Supreme Court subsequently reiterated its deference to the military due 
to its status as a special society in Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) and Secretary of the 
Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453 (1980), companion cases in which the Court found “that 
discipline and efficiency outweighed any absolute right to circulate petitions on military 
bases.” Morris, supra note 19, at 665–66. However, the Court upheld the military regulations 
in Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 848–49 (1976) that required permits prior to distributing 
on-base petitions as reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. The cases did not directly 
deal with criminal sanctions nor discuss the speech rights of military members. See Brown 
v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding Air Force regulations requiring base commander 
approval prior to distribution of on-base petitions); Sec’y of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453, 
458 (1980) (upholding similar Navy regulations as those in Brown).  
 233 When a few First Amendment cases after Priest reached Article III courts via 
collateral attacks, the federal appellate courts applied great deference to the military’s 
adjudicative process; the D.C. Circuit stated in 1975 that it would not “overturn a [military] 
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Parker—the Dennis bad tendency formulation of the Schenck clear and present 
danger test—reveal similar logic as that used in the Dennis decision and earlier 
reviled Supreme Court cases.234 That is, the military appellate court utilized the 
“clear and present danger” moniker in a conclusory fashion to criminalize 
speech without requiring either imminence or probability of the particular 
danger in question nor express intent.235 Before turning to a few emblematic 
post-Priest cases, it is worth noting that the military appellate court tested its 
Supreme Court-approved Priest approach in speech cases prior to Priest. United 
States v. Howe exemplifies the incipient military speech doctrine prior to its 
formal incantation in Priest.236  In Howe, the military appellate court upheld 
appellant’s convictions for both conduct unbecoming an officer and using 
contemptuous words against the president for the same speech: carrying a sign, 
while not in uniform and not on a military installation, in an anti-Vietnam protest 
that read “[l]et’s have more than a choice between petty ignorant facists [sic] in 
1968” on one side and “[e]nd Johnson’s facist [sic] agression [sic] in Viet Nam 
[sic]” on the other.237 The court quoted Justice Holmes in Frohwerk: “[N]either 
Hamilton nor Madison, nor any other competent person then or later, ever 
supposed that to make criminal the counseling of a murder within the 
jurisdiction of Congress would be an unconstitutional interference with free 
speech.”238 But the second lieutenant was not counseling murder or any other 
                                                                                                                     
conviction unless it is clearly apparent that, in the face of a First Amendment claim, the 
military lacks a legitimate interest in proscribing the defendant’s conduct.” Avrech v. Sec’y 
of the Navy, 520 F.2d 100, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1975) rev’d per curiam sub nom. Sec’y of the 
Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974) (reversing in light of the Parker decision).  
 234 See supra Part III.C.3 (describing cases such as Gitlow). 
 235 Calling it a test is grossly inaccurate, as it was employed by the military appellate 
court as window dressing for the criminalization of speech the military did not like, hence 
the use of the term “moniker” here instead. 
 236 United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 429, 431 (C.M.A. 1967) (sentenced to a dismissal 
and two years hard labor, later reduced to dismissal and one year hard labor for the sign he 
carried protesting the Vietnam War); see also United States v. Gray, 41 C.M.R 756 (1969), 
rev’d, 42 C.M.R. 255, 260 (C.M.A. 1970) (refusing to uphold conviction for disloyal 
statements because the prosecution failed to prove disloyalty against the government versus 
as against the Army, but finding that because statements were written in a military log by a 
servicemember with a good reputation, the prejudice to good order and discipline was 
“reasonably direct and palpable,” despite the fact that fellow servicemembers did not take 
them seriously). 
 237 Howe, 37 C.M.R. at 432. The military appellate court implied in 2001 that if tried 
today, the Howe charges would be considered multiplicitous for findings. See United States 
v. Frelix-Vann, 55 M.J. 329, 331–32 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (specifically mentioning Howe in its 
explanation that later Supreme Court lesser-included-offense jurisprudence had changed the 
military court’s multiplicity approach). 
 238 Howe, 37 C.M.R. at 436 (citing Justices Holmes in Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 206). The 
Frohwerk quote is usually associated with speech that falls within the “speech integral to a 
crime” exception, such as solicitation. See Eugene Volokh, The Speech Integral to Criminal 
Conduct Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 989 (2016) (highlighting that the Court in 
Frohwerk, like in Abrams, was trying to draw a line between advocacy and criminal 
solicitation of illegal conduct). 
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crime; indeed, all he was doing was advocating for political change in both the 
White House and in the extant war.239 Yet the court rested its approval of the 
military’s punishment of this reservist’s speech because of the court’s belief that 
the speech was linked to treason.240 To make this leap, the court canvassed the 
history of Article 88, finding that “[t]he evil which Article 88 . . . seeks to avoid 
is the impairment of discipline and the promotion of insubordination by an 
officer of the military service in using contemptuous words toward the Chief of 
State.”241  
After highlighting that the United States was currently suffering casualties 
in Vietnam (as if that was relevant),242 the CMA provided the following bald 
conclusion: in reference to Howe’s placard, “That in the present times and 
circumstances such conduct by an officer constitutes a clear and present danger 
to discipline within our armed services, under the precedents established by the 
Supreme Court, seems to require no argument.”243 The court did additionally 
emphasize the importance of civilian control of the military,244 implying that 
“[f]ree expression can threaten civilian control of the military,”245 though not 
explaining how Howe’s placard could do so.246 Furthermore, in line with the 
fact that neither Article 88 nor Article 133 (then nor now) required any 
particular mens rea,247 the CMA did not, despite Brandenburg, require the 
government to prove that Howe had any intent to cause the parade of horribles 
the CMA marched out as speculatively possible. 
The court’s finding that a misspelled sign referring to a president’s “fascist” 
policies, carried by an off-duty soldier in civilian clothes in an off-base protest, 
served as a gateway for mutiny and sedition certainly seems a far cry from clear 
and present danger by any stretch of the imagination. Though there was zero 
evidence that any military members had seen Howe or his sign, never mind any 
moved to mutiny, the court found the young officer’s language contemptuous 
per se against President Johnson because of the circumstances of his words, 
                                                                                                                     
 239 See Howe, 37 C.M.R. at 432. 
 240 See id. at 436–38. 
 241 Id. at 437. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. at 438. 
 244 Id. at 439 (noting that both Canada and the U.S. are “nations [that] have a long 
tradition based upon Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence which has consistently subordinated the 
military to the civilian in Government”). 
 245 Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 18, at 405; see also id. at 405–06 (listing the 
four primary reasons the military uses to justify a different standard for suppression of speech 
in a military context than that standard which is applicable to civilians, including civilian 
control of the military). 
 246 Referring to the fact that the appellant was a reservist, the court explained that it 
“would surely be ill-advised to make an exception for the civilian soldier which would 
inevitably inure to the advantage of the recalcitrant professional military man by providing 
an entering wedge for incipient mutiny and sedition.” Howe, 37 C.M.R at 439. 
 247 When no intent is specified, common law principles dictate that the accused had to 
be acting at least negligently with regard to the actus reus and typically other elements too. 
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explaining that “[t]he language utilized on the appellant’s placard is hardly 
susceptible to more than one interpretation . . . [f]ascism signifies the antithesis 
of our own system of Government and for the public office holder imputes both 
malfeasance of office and the more horrendous crime of disloyalty.”248 
This was not the military appellate court’s final word regarding conduct 
unbecoming, and therefore criminal, speech. Twenty years after the Supreme 
Court upheld Parker’s conduct unbecoming conviction, the military appellate 
court employed its military speech doctrine in typical fashion in United States 
v. Hartwig in 1994.249 In Hartwig, the military appellate court found that an 
officer’s sexually-suggestive letter to a fourteen-year-old girl represented a 
“‘clear and present danger’ that the speech will, ‘in dishonoring or disgracing 
the officer personally, seriously compromise[ ] the person’s standing as an 
officer.’”250  
Given that appellant challenged his Article 133 conduct unbecoming 
conviction, a different crime than the Article 134 prejudicial to good order and 
discipline offense at issue in Priest, the Hartwig court first noted the Schenck 
maxim that speech may be restricted to prevent the “substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.”251 Employing circular reasoning, it held that 
in the military, “those ‘substantive evils’ are violations of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice.”252 The court articulated that “the test is whether the officer’s 
speech poses a ‘clear and present danger’ that the speech will, ‘in dishonoring 
                                                                                                                     
 248 Id. at 445; see also Morris, supra note 19, at 671 (criticizing the court’s decision as 
“not clear whether it was the topic of Vietnam, the fact of a public march, or Howe’s signs 
themselves that were the basis of the decision”). 
 249 United States v. Hartwig, 39 M.J. 125, 130 (C.M.A. 1994). While the military 
appellate court had at least one other conduct unbecoming conviction based on appellant’s 
speech reach it for decision after Parker, it avoided the constitutional question. See United 
States v. Norvell, 26 M.J. 477, 480 (C.M.A. 1988) (affirming conviction of military officer 
for conduct unbecoming in her official capacity by communicating to an enlisted subordinate 
details of how to avoid drug detection during a urinalysis and admitting that appellant had 
used such procedures to avoid drug detection herself; this speech was found to be 
“behavior . . . which, in dishonoring or disgracing the individual as a commissioned officer, 
seriously detracts from her character as a lady,” yet the Court did not address the 
constitutionality of punishing such speech).  
 250 Hartwig, 39 M.J. at 128, 130. While the government did not charge as an element of 
the crime that the appellant knew the recipient was a minor, the court concluded, in denying 
appellant’s legal sufficiency claim, that he knew she was of “tender age.” Id. at 130.   
 251 Id. at 128. This appears to be the impermissible bootstrapping rationale outlined by 
Professor Volokh. See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1011 (explaining that “[i]t is not enough 
that the speech itself be labeled illegal conduct, e.g., . . . ’breach of the peace,’ 
‘sedition,’ . . . [r]ather, it must help cause or threaten other illegal conduct . . . which may 
make restricting the speech a justifiable means of preventing that other conduct” (emphasis 
omitted)). Simply stating that the evil prevented is violation of any military penal provision 
does not suffice to explain why that provision does not warrant First Amendment protection 
given that the penal provision turns on the communicative impact—the content—of the 
speech at issue. 
 252 See Hartwig, 39 M.J. at 128.  
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or disgracing the officer personally, seriously compromise[ ] the person’s 
standing as an officer.’”253  
After thus deciding the approach to whether private speech is protected in 
the Article 133 context, the Hartwig court continued the military speech 
doctrine’s approach of not requiring actual harm to support a finding of clear 
and present danger.254 That is, no showing of harm to the officer’s standing as 
an officer is required for Article 133 speech crimes: “[t]o the extent that 
appellant argues that the prosecution must prove actual damage to the reputation 
of the military, we reject his argument. Forbidden speech is measured by ‘its 
tendency,’ not its actual effect.”255  
Furthermore, per the military speech doctrine—which, as seen in Priest, is 
simply the Supreme Court’s bad tendency perversion of the clear and present 
danger test, drawn from Dennis—the military court in Hartwig did not require 
any degree of proximity between speech and potential harm, nor did it require 
intent to cause such harm. The opinion instead concluded that since it appeared 
that appellant at least suspected that the intended recipient of his sexually-
suggestive letter was a minor, that was enough to conclude that “appellant’s 
conduct presented a clear and present danger of disgracing or dishonoring 
appellant personally and thereby brought ‘dishonor or disrepute upon the 
military profession he represents.’”256 The court failed to explain the 
“thereby”—how appellant’s personal disgrace presented a clear and present 
danger of service disrepute. Indeed, the concurring opinion specifically faulted 
the majority for this oversight, characterizing the danger as being “cloudy and 
remote” instead of “clear and present.”257  
Two years later, in United States v. Brown, a plurality writing for CAAF 
cited both Hartwig and Priest to uphold a conviction for conspiracy to strike in 
violation of Article 81, UCMJ, against a First Amendment overbreadth 
challenge.258 The Brown opinion is important because it summarized the leading 
                                                                                                                     
 253 Id. (quoting MCM, supra note 22, at Part IV, ¶ 59c(2)). 
 254 Id. at 130. 
 255 Id. (citing United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338, 345 (C.M.A. 1972)). 
 256 Id. at 129 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 754 (1974)). 
 257 Hartwig, 39 M.J. at 130 (Cox, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority because he 
found the letter “disgraceful”). Given that appellant had asked in his letter for a nude photo 
of appellant, id. at 127, it seems that the gravamen of the harm in Hartwig was not 
hypothetical service disrepute caused by an officer’s dishonor but the societal harm caused 
by solicitation of child pornography. It seems clear that, given the evidentiary weaknesses 
regarding appellant’s knowledge of the age of the child whom he asked, see id. at 130. the 
military chose to charge conduct unbecoming instead of solicitation to commit a federal 
offense, and by doing so emptied “clear and present danger” of real meaning.  
 258  See United States v. Brown, 45 M.J. 389, 389 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (plurality opinion) 
(affirming appellant’s conviction for organizing in violation of a federal statute prohibiting 
establishing military unions, as charged through clause 3, Article 134). Appellant, a 
guardsman activated for the Persian Gulf War and in training at a Texas military base, had 
organized a battalion-wide meeting to discuss “complaints concerning living conditions, 
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military appellate approach to the constitutionality of military speech crimes and 
discussed three primary reasons why servicemembers’ speech rights can be 
curtailed to a greater extent than those not in uniform: the need for discipline, 
military mission, and civilian supremacy.259 Furthermore, this opinion 
highlights the extremely ad hoc and speculative nature of the military speech 
doctrine; the Brown court spent more time both discussing UMCJ speech crimes 
that were not charged and emphasizing that other U.S. servicemembers were 
deployed to the Persian Gulf at the time of appellant’s conduct than analyzing 
why appellant’s conduct was indeed criminal despite its expressive nature.260 
In finding that appellant’s right to expression was not violated, the Brown 
plurality first noted that dangerous speech was unprotected speech.261 
Combining Priest and Parker, it proclaimed that “[t]he test in the military is 
whether the speech interferes with or prevents the orderly accomplishment of 
the mission or presents a clear danger to loyalty, discipline, mission, or morale 
of the troops,” a test that has been later cited by lower courts and CAAF.262 
Interestingly, the Brown plurality, in passing, also noted a standard applied by 
the D.C. Circuit in a Vietnam-era case: “Courts will ‘not overturn a conviction 
unless it is clearly apparent that, in the face of a First Amendment claim, the 
military lacks a legitimate interest in proscribing the defendant’s conduct.’”263 
However, a thorough review of subsequent military case law finds no use of this 
legitimate interest standard, though as one CAAF judge has noted, “the case law 
is susceptible to multiple interpretations and applications.”264 
                                                                                                                     
long hours, inadequate time off, pay problems, and perceived poor leadership.” Id. at 392 
(appellant had also arranged for a charter bus home the next day for some of his colleagues). 
 259 Id. at 396–97 (“However, this right must be tempered in a military setting based on 
the mission of the military, the need for obedience of orders, and civilian supremacy.”). 
 260 The concurring judge noted that appellant’s conduct actually involved mutiny in 
violation of Article 94, UCMJ. Id. at 399 (Cox, J., concurring); see also Brown, 45 M.J. at 
402 (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (noting also that the white soldiers who actually did wrongfully 
take a bus home from the same base were not court-martialed—only the black soldiers who 
talked about it were prosecuted). 
 261 Brown, 45 M.J. at 395 (plurality opinion) (“This is a lower standard not requiring ‘an 
intent to incite’ or an ‘imminent’ danger.”) 
 262 Id. at 395. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pope, 63 M.J. 68, 75 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing Brown and 
Priest in a case involving a recruiter’s inappropriate conduct towards potential recruits). 
 263 Brown, 45 M.J. at 396 (citing Avrech v. Sec’y of the Navy, 520 F.2d 100, 103 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975)). Instead of explaining how the military speech doctrine it had just clarified 
actually applied to appellant’s speech, the plurality instead simply noted that while appellant 
was complaining about living conditions at Fort Hood, other soldiers were living in austere 
conditions in the Persian Gulf. See id. at 392. 
 264 United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 456 (C.A.A.F. 2008). The dissent in Wilcox 
noted that such a legitimate interest standard “does not adequately protect the liberty interests 
involved, for virtually anything might be viewed as a ‘legitimate interest’ when national 
security is invoked.” Id. 
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C. More Military Speech: Other Categories Plus Wilcox 
For the last almost fifty years, the military courts, as well as federal courts 
in their few military speech-related cases,265 have employed Priest and Parker’s 
bad tendency clear and present danger approach to uphold convictions for 
supposedly dangerous speech without demanding any showing as to 
seriousness, likelihood, or imminency of harm.266 Furthermore, dangerous 
speech is not the only category of unprotected speech that the military courts 
have seemingly expanded, though it is the one stretched the furthest. In addition 
to dangerous speech, the high military appellate court has also utilized the 
“fighting words” categorical exception to address convictions under 
Article 117, UCMJ’s “provoking speech” provision, despite the seeming 
desuetude such category has fallen into on the civilian front.267 Additionally, 
the military appellate courts have also upheld military prosecution of indecent 
speech as obscenity, though the military definition of indecency is broader than 
the Court’s “prurient interest” definition of obscenity.268 In doing so, CAAF 
                                                                                                                     
 265 See, e.g., Millican v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 2d 296, 300, 307 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(finding that a reserve officer’s encouragement of squadron mates to refuse anthrax 
vaccination orders and his statements questioning commander’s credibility and concern for 
colleagues were not protected by First Amendment because they “may . . . undermine the 
effectiveness of response to command” (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974)); 
Wilson v. James, 139 F. Supp. 3d 410, 426, 432 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, No. 15-5338, 2016 
WL 3043746 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (finding that neither a military member’s email to senior 
military officer urging no same-sex marriages at West Point Chapel nor his social media post 
complaining about superior officer were First Amendment-protected speech because “speech 
by a member of the military that undermines the chain of command, and the obedience, 
order, and discipline it is designed to ensure, does not receive First Amendment protection,” 
though the court failed to explain how petitioner’s speech had such an effect). Cf. Goldman 
v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504, 507 (1986) (upholding military’s authority to prohibit 
yarmulke wear by officer in uniform and stating, although a religious-expression and not 
speech case, that “[t]he military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent 
that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First Amendment”). 
 266 See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 37 M.J. 558, 565 (A.C.M.R. 1993), aff’d, 40 M.J. 
420 (C.M.A. 1994) (upholding Article 134 service-discrediting conviction for giving speech 
in uniform at local high school falsely bragging about combat exploits because “[t]he 
government provided ample evidence of a diminished confidence by those who heard the 
appellant in the integrity of service-members in general.”); see also United States v. Hartwig, 
39 M.J. 125, 130 (C.M.A. 1994).  
 267 See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 46 C.M.R. 88, 90 (C.M.A. 1972) (citing 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (finding that Article 117 passed 
First Amendment muster); United States v. Killion, 75 M.J. 209, 215 (C.A.A.F. 2016) 
(reversing an Article 117 conviction based on jury instruction that utilized average instead 
of reasonable person standard that failed to take into account listeners’ training); see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 129, at 1053–54 (noting fighting words’ current disuse as an 
unprotected category). 
 268 United States v. Moore, 38 M.J. 490, 492 (C.M.A. 1994) (“‘Indecent’ is synonymous 
with ‘obscene,’ and such language is not afforded constitutional protection.”); United States 
v. French, 31 M.J. 57, 59 (C.M.A. 1990) (“The term [indecent] has been held equivalent to, 
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unsurprisingly has referred to Parker and Priest for the proposition that 
obedience and discipline require a different First Amendment for the military—
and as with its dangerous words jurisprudence, without real explanation as to 
why.269  
Despite the seeming permanence of the dangerous words military speech 
doctrine and its mission-creep into other unprotected categories, CAAF 
modified it ever so slightly in 2008, at least regarding service-discrediting 
speech, in United States v. Wilcox.270 In overturning appellant’s Article 134 
conviction for publicly espousing racist views online, CAAF emphasized that 
the definition of unprotected dangerous speech remained the same Howe-Priest-
Parker-Brown approach it had taken for years.271 But instead of deciding that 
the speech charged as Article 134 service-discrediting speech constitutes 
dangerous speech by simply inferring a tendency to discredit,272 and therefore 
placing such speech beyond First Amendment protection as part of the 
dangerous speech category—as it had previously with earlier cases charging 
speech as service-discrediting as well as Article 133 and clause one cases273—
the court for the first time overtly required a direct connection between the 
                                                                                                                     
or synonymous with, ‘immodest,’ ‘immoral,’ ‘impure,’ . . . ’obscene’” (citations omitted)); 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 477 (1957) (“[T]he standard for judging obscenity . . . is 
whether, to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant 
theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest.”). Military indecent 
language is that “grossly offensive to modesty, decency, or propriety, or shocks the moral 
sense, because of its vulgar, filthy, or disgusting nature, or its tendency to incite lustful 
thought.” MCM, supra note 22, at Part IV, ¶ 89(c). “Language is indecent if it tends 
reasonably to corrupt morals or incite libidinous thoughts.” Id. 
 269 Moore, 38 M.J. at 493. Indecent language is an Article 134 clause one or two offense, 
or Article 133 conduct unbecoming crime. See, e.g., id. (explaining that indecent language 
formed the basis of appellant’s conduct unbecoming conviction); see also MCM, supra note 
22, at Pt. IV, ¶ 89; see also United States v. Lambert, No. ACM 38291, 2014 WL 842966, 
at *2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2014) (upholding indecent language conviction against 
Wilcox challenge based on status of military indecency as unprotected obscenity). 
 270 United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 448–49 (C.A.A.F. 2008). 
 271 Id. at 448 (approvingly citing the Brown definition of dangerous speech). 
 272 Following CAAF’s lead, the lower service appellate court in Wilcox had simply 
concluded that appellant’s speech was service-discrediting and hence dangerous because 
“members of the general public have access to [A]ppellant’s publicly-posted comments, and 
upon reading them, may tend to find the Army—as represented by [A]ppellant—a 
disreputable institution, or one disserving [sic] less than full public esteem and respect.” Id. 
at 445. 
 273 See, e.g., United States v. Irvin, 60 M.J. 23, 26 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (finding that 
possession of photos with minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct is service-
discrediting); United States v. Saunders, 59 M.J. 1, 9 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (finding harassment 
service-discrediting); United States v. Guerrero, 33 M.J. 295, 297–98 (C.M.A. 1991) 
(upholding cross-dressing as service-discrediting); United States v. Davis, 26 M.J. 445, 449–
50 (C.M.A. 1988) (upholding service-discrediting conviction for cross-dressing); see also 
United States v. Greene, 34 M.J. 713, 714 (A.C.M.R. 1992) (finding appellant’s false 
swearing to a criminal investigator service-discrediting).  
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speech and the military.274 Specifically, CAAF required that if the speech at 
issue was otherwise protected speech—that is, not obscenity, fighting words, or 
dangerous speech per its broad Brown definition of the latter—the government 
had to prove that it had a “direct and palpable connection between speech and 
the military mission or military environment” in order for the charge to be 
legally sufficient.275 This was a novel twist, given that the whole point of 
CAAF’s dangerous speech doctrine up to that point had been a determination 
that if speech “interfere[d] with or prevent[ed] the orderly accomplishment of 
the mission or present[ed] a clear danger to loyalty, discipline, mission, or 
morale of the troops,” it was dangerous, and hence unprotected.276 Yet this was 
not really a new requirement. If said speech had no direct connection to the 
military mission or environment, it should not have fallen within CAAF’s 
unprotected category in the first place, though the above cases demonstrate the 
opposite. Speech cannot interfere with, or present a clear danger to, the military 
without such a nexus, surely. Hence, this supposedly “new” direct connection 
requirement was, at least impliedly, already a component of dangerous military 
speech since that doctrine’s crystallization in Howe, Priest, Parker, and Brown. 
Instead of simply clarifying that unprotected dangerous military speech 
already required such a connection, CAAF confusingly held that even if speech 
was not at first blush dangerous—that is, it did not interfere with the mission or 
present clear danger to the troop’s morale, discipline or loyalty—it could 
nonetheless still be unprotected, apparently as dangerous, if it (1) had a direct 
and palpable connection to the military and (2) satisfied Priest’s ad hoc Dennis 
balancing test: “Ultimately, this Court must weigh the gravity of the effect of 
the speech, discounted by the improbability of its effectiveness on the audience 
the speaker sought to reach.”277 The Wilcox opinion seems to have simply re-
packaged the existing military speech doctrine in order to give its inherent nexus 
requirement more teeth, finding no such connection existed for appellant’s racist 
posts.278 
While the Wilcox approach seems to cabin slightly the wide scope of 
service-discrediting speech crimes, its protective effect going forward is 
doubtful. The identical connection long required for Article 134 clause one 
crimes, similar to Article 133’s nexus, did little to this end. Indeed, service 
                                                                                                                     
 274 Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 448–49. 
 275 Id. at 449; cf. United States v. Phillips, 70 M.J. 161, 163 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (holding 
that public awareness of accused’s possession of child pornography not required for service-
discrediting conviction). Phillips is consistent with Wilcox in that child pornography is 
considered unprotected speech by the Supreme Court and Wilcox’s direct connection 
requirement only applies to speech not otherwise unprotected. 
 276 See United States v. Brown, 45 M.J. 389, 395 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
 277 Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 449. 
 278 CAAF found no direct connection to the military because the posts were made on a 
non-military public online chat room, stressing that appellant had merely held himself out 
(“purported to be”) an Army paratrooper, ignoring, much to the dissent’s understandable 
chagrin, that appellant actually was a paratrooper. See id. at 453 (Baker J., dissenting). 
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appellate courts in speech cases following Wilcox have easily found its nexus 
requirement met, facilitated by Wilcox’s emphasis on the lack of evidence in 
that case that a civilian’s opinion of the military was actually tarnished by 
defendant’s speech.279 For example, in United States v. Blair, the lower court 
found that there was indeed a direct and palpable connection to the service 
because a civilian airport manager felt sick to his stomach when he found out 
that the active-duty appellant had posted KKK-recruiting posters in the public 
bathrooms in the airport.280  
However, in upholding a speech conviction merely because the military 
found a civilian who thought poorly of the military due to appellant’s speech, 
the service court in Blair did exactly what the Wilcox majority said it feared 
would happen without its new requirement: that “the entire universe of 
servicemember opinions, ideas, and speech would be held to the subjective 
standard of what some member of the public, or even many members of the 
public, would find offensive.”281 And this is exactly what will continue to 
happen with service-discrediting speech crimes, given that CAAF’s nexus 
requirement provides no objective criteria for the military and its courts to use 
when analyzing the connective sufficiency of offensive speech. Instead, 
“connection” is simply being interpreted as evidence of actual discredit.282 
 Wilcox and its progeny underscore the fundamental problem that 
attaches to the existing military speech doctrine: the absence of objective 
standards for determining this supposed connection, and for weighing 
sufficiency and imminency of harm, exacerbated by the great deference given 
the military. Furthermore, Wilcox ultimately also reveals the inappropriateness 
of criminalizing service-discrediting speech (as well as other conduct), 
regardless of whether such speech has a direct connection to the military 
mission. It is simply not a bad thing for the U.S. public to think ill of the military 
in a democracy; indeed, the Founding Fathers were highly distrustful of a 
standing army, and such dislike had and can have powerful beneficial effects, 
as detailed in this next Part. 
                                                                                                                     
 279 Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 451 (plurality opinion).  
 280 United States v. Blair, 67 M.J. 566, 571 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2008); see also United 
States v. Rapert, 75 M.J. 164, 170–71 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (upholding an Article 134 conviction 
for making a threat to kill the President to civilian neighbors, despite appellant’s claim he 
was merely “venting”; concluding that his speech met the Wilcox connection to military 
mission because his comments were “counter to the ethos of the United States armed forces” 
and had a tendency to undermine responsiveness to command, though there was no evidence 
other military members knew of appellant’s speech). 
 281 Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 449. 
 282 Friess, supra note 19, at 25 (concluding that Wilcox requires actual discredit instead 
of tendency to discredit). 
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V. PROTECTED MILITARY SPEECH  
The military speech doctrine is a weak ad hoc balancing approach that is 
extremely deferential to the military’s decision that particular speech needs to 
be punished—a “free-floating test” of the type that the Court has rejected due to 
its danger to free expression.283 Current doctrine requires that courts strike a 
balance “between the essential needs of the armed services and the right to speak 
out as a free American,” and further mandate that courts must decide “whether 
the gravity of the effect of [the] accused’s publications on good order and 
discipline in the armed forces, discounted by the improbability of their 
effectiveness on the audience he sought to reach, justifies his conviction.”284 
This approach lacks objective standards to measure the elements that CAAF 
claims to be balancing: the private interest of the servicemember versus the 
seriousness and probability of the harm; furthermore, this approach has no 
imminency nor intent requirements.285 The result is a cession of power to the 
military to criminalize a huge area of speech without rigorous analysis, 
suppressing some speech that is harmful to the military, while also punishing 
speech with only a speculative chance of producing slight harm. The following 
Part outlines a necessary replacement for this approach and provides a 
concomitant statutory reform. 
A. Uniquely Military Speech-Integral Crimes 
In Part III, I establish a military speech typology and explained that category 
one’s speech-integral crimes do not raise First Amendment concerns for the 
same reasons analogue civilian crimes do not.286 However, regarding uniquely 
military speech-integral crimes, the military courts apply a speech doctrine that 
is analytically unfit for the task. A better rationale for considering the 
constitutionality of such military speech crimes is the logic underlying the 
“speech integral to crime” categorical exception to First Amendment protection. 
This long-recognized category of unprotected speech far better supports the 
necessity and appropriateness of these crimes, despite their effect on expression. 
Replacing the current military speech doctrine with the crime integral to speech 
exception to exempt UCMJ speech crimes in category two from constitutional 
protection is not merely form over substance. While the end result—lack of 
constitutional protection for such speech—will be the same for these handful of 
uniquely military crimes, the process of determining why they are integral to 
                                                                                                                     
 283 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)). 
 284 United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344–45 (C.M.A. 1972). 
 285 See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, & THE USES OF LANGUAGE 222–24 (1989) 
(discussing the unsatisfactory nature of the clear and present danger ad hoc balancing 
approach to speech protection).  
 286 See supra Part III.A (noting the exceptions allowing crimes such as solicitation and 
perjury to be excepted under the speech integral to crime exception). 
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crime forces clarity regarding the divergence between military and civilian 
speech. Furthermore, it aligns the military courts’ First Amendment doctrine 
with that of today’s Supreme Court.287 
Specifically, the Court’s speech integral to crime exception allows content-
based restrictions on speech that “tends to cause, attempts to cause, or makes a 
threat to cause some illegal conduct,” with the latter being something other than 
the criminalized speech itself.288 The Court has used this exception to allow, for 
example, the criminalization of solicitation, child pornography, and 
conspiracy.289 Similar to these crimes, most of the category two military speech 
crimes are crimes due to the uncontroversial and widespread recognition of the 
risk of actual harm (criminality) associated with their prohibited speech.290 For 
example, like child pornography’s causal link to harm to children—which has 
been recognized by the Supreme Court—false official statements in the military 
are directly linked to mission failure, and hence lack First Amendment 
protection due to their role as “integral to crime”—the crime, if you will, of 
mission failure. False official statements operationalize said harm; “Combat is 
too, dangerous too fast moving, and too stressful for leaders to have to doubt the 
truth of what they are told.”291 
Category two military speech crimes—including contemptuous words by 
officers toward certain public officials; disrespect toward a superior 
commissioned officer; insubordinate conduct toward non-commissioned 
officer; cruelty and maltreatment; mutiny; false official statements; subordinate 
compelling surrender; and improper use of countersign—are similarly crimes 
because of their close nexus to a separate harm.292 While the linked-to harm of 
these military crimes is not a separate, distinct crime as are the cases of 
solicitation and conspiracy, the crimes themselves operationalize harm that is 
otherwise impossible to capture as a distinct crime. Primarily, this distinct harm 
involves responsiveness to command, an integral component of discipline that 
                                                                                                                     
 287 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 985 (noting the Roberts Court’s revision of First 
Amendment doctrine to eliminate what Greenawalt calls “categorical balancing”). 
 288 Id. at 986. 
 289 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288, 298 (2008) (explaining that 
solicitation falls into a speech integral to crime exception to the First Amendment); New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982) (acknowledging an exception for child 
pornography); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 226 US. 490, 491 (1949) (recognizing 
conspiracy in restraint of trade as an exception). 
 290 See MORRIS, supra note 13, at 83. 
 291 See id. (explaining “the potentially fatal consequences . . . and the potential impact 
on national security when such a representation has been relied on to a leader’s or a unit’s 
detriment”). 
 292 See supra Part II.B. However, this link does not exist for Article 88 regarding retired 
officers, as they no longer have a role in the disciplinary chain, and hence the crime should 
therefore be narrowed to active duty officers only. 
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the courts have long recognized as necessary for effective military 
functioning.293 
In the case of contemptuous words, disrespect, insubordination, and cruelty 
crimes, the resultant harm each offense operationalizes is degradation of the 
superior-subordinate relationship, the DNA of the military organizational 
structure.294 Usurpation of superiors’ authority in critical combat situations is 
the harm corresponding with countersign and compelling surrender crimes.295 
Collective harm to the superior-subordinate relationship and hence wide-spread 
deterioration of military functioning results from mutiny; and mission failure 
and degradation of trust among military members jeopardizing military 
cohesion and efficacy result from false official statements.296 All these “harms” 
are on par with speech integral to crime’s “illegal conduct,” thus constitutionally 
justifying these military speech crimes’ punishment of speech that causes or 
threatens to cause such harm. 
One could argue that this re-categorization of these offenses falls within the 
speech integral to crime exception and is simply recognition by another name 
of a distinct categorical “military exception” to otherwise protected speech. My 
recommendation merely labels these crimes as “speech integral to crime 
exception” to acknowledge the Roberts Court’s insistence that content-based 
speech restrictions only be “permitted . . . when confined to the few ‘historic 
and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar.’”297 Given that 
there is a historic integral to crime exception, and there has never been a distinct 
category of unprotected military speech—these crimes instead have been shoe-
horned into a stretched and almost unrecognizable category of incitement—my 
proposal seems rational. This recommendation that most uniquely military 
speech crimes be recognized as within the speech integral to crime exception is 
more than just nomenclature, given my argument that these military speech 
crimes uniquely operationalize military-specific harm, akin to conspiracy’s 
manifestation of the harm of collective criminality. 
                                                                                                                     
 293 See, e.g., In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890) (“An army is not a deliberative 
body . . . [n]o question can be left open as to the right to command in the officer, or the duty 
of obedience in the soldier.”); see also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (arguing 
that the military may restrict the soldier’s right to free speech in peace time because speech 
may “undermine the effectiveness of response to command”). 
 294 Article 88’s speech, in addition to degrading the superior-subordinate relationship 
between officers and the Commander-in-Chief, also is linked to degradation of civilian 
control of the military; this latter harm explains why not only contemptuous words against 
the President are criminalized, but also those against Congress and certain other civilian 
officials. United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 429, 434–35 (C.M.A. 1967). 
 295 See MORRIS, supra note13, at 74 (explaining the gravamen of harm of these 
offenses). 
 296 See id. at 83–84 (“A soldier must be able to be trusted to tell the truth, especially 
about matters that relate to the mission.”). 
 297 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. 
v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991)). 
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Yet this categorical exception only gets one so far. The speech integral to 
crime category should not avoid a searching First Amendment inquiry simply 
because a type of speech is argued as criminally harmful.298 The nexus to 
criminal conduct—harm that, when operationalized, takes the form of crimes 
such as mutiny and insubordination—must be sufficiently close, otherwise 
simply by calling certain speech illegal would move it into this exception, 
eviscerating the utility of unprotected categories. Such a close relationship 
between speech and illegal harm seems traditionally uncontroverted for the 
above crimes.299 But category two’s disobedience crimes—Articles 90, 91, and 
92—are more vulnerable to such manipulation.300 A superior could 
hypothetically order a subordinate to not engage in whatever speech that 
superior finds offensive, with disobedience of said order automatically made 
criminal through these articles. Hence, I recommend these facially content-
neutral, generally-applicable crimes not fall under the speech integral to crime 
exception. Strict scrutiny should be used to test constitutionality when these 
disobedience crimes turn on the content of speech; this is explained further in 
infra Part V.D.  
B. The Elimination of Article 134, Clause 2 
Moving to the UCMJ’s catch-all speech crimes: Congress should eliminate 
Article 134’s service-discrediting crime altogether, for speech and all other 
conduct. This would right a wrong that Congress remedied for the rest of 
American society almost a century ago. CAAF in Wilcox exposed the 
fundamental flaw in finding criminal supposedly discrediting conduct, and 
particularly speech.301 This crime hinges on the lawfulness of otherwise 
protected speech—even core political speech—on the speculative possibility 
that members of the public will think poorly of the military because of such 
speech, and somehow this lowered opinion will lead to mission 
ineffectiveness.302  
This flawed reasoning both underestimates the common sense of the 
American people and overestimates the primacy of the military in our 
constitutional schema. Regarding the latter: if military necessity were 
preeminent, then the Bill of Rights would not have been needed. Our Founding 
Fathers distrusted a standing Army and prioritized other values above military 
effectiveness: “A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that 
                                                                                                                     
 298 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 987. 
 299 However, Article 88 remains of dubious constitutionality when applied to retired 
military officers, and should be amended to apply solely to those on active duty. 
 300 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1046 (citing the Third Circuit’s opinion in King v. 
Governor, 767 F.3d 216, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2014)); see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 890–92 (2016). 
 301 See generally United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (holding that an 
Article 134 conviction requires a direct and palpable connection between the speech in 
question and the military mission or military environment). 
 302 See id. at 448–49. 
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it may be a necessary, provision.”303 That the military’s reputation may be 
lowered in the public’s eyes is not sufficiently harmful to outweigh the 
servicemembers’ right to engage in otherwise lawful behavior and speech: “The 
only limitations that should be placed on soldiers’ rights are those directly 
necessary for military effectiveness.”304 
Let’s put aside the troubling speculative harm issues this crime entails, 
which alone should fatally taint this offense. Even assuming that some 
substantial discrediting will occur due to certain speech, the fundamental 
question remains—is lowering the military in the public’s eye a bad thing in our 
constitutional democracy? If such effect is produced by actual military member 
speech or other conduct, I argue that despite any negative effect it could have 
on recruiting or support for military operations, said reduction in support is a 
necessary corollary of a standing military in our constitutional democracy. That 
is, there is a price to pay for the accounting that the constitution demands the 
public be able to make of its military.  
While the military and judicial rationales for the service-discrediting crime 
have morphed over time, the leading rationale has been the effect on recruiting 
that theoretically could occur if Americans thought less of their standing 
military; unsurprisingly, this claim mirrors the rationale undergirding much of 
the later reviled Espionage-Sedition Act.305 Indeed, some parents may feel more 
reluctant today to have their daughters and sons serve in a military that seems 
incapable of adequately addressing sexual assault, or that seems replete with 
chauvinistic Trump supporters.306 But that is part of the point behind Congress’s 
switch to an all-volunteer force following Vietnam: the new accession policy 
was partially designed to make it harder for politicians to engage the military 
without significant public support.307  
If such public support is lowered by military member conduct, so be it. The 
military needs to work harder on recruiting, training, educating, and leading a 
force whose values better match those of society and the Constitution, and not 
simply hide from America how its members really act and feel by criminalizing 
speech the military claims could have this effect. Public perceptions of military 
                                                                                                                     
 303 THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 251 (James Madison) (“[I]t is an object of laudable 
circumspection and precaution.”); see also Andrew J. Bacevich, Whose Army?, in THE 
MODERN AMERICAN MILITARY 194–95, 198 (David M. Kennedy ed., 2013) (describing the 
post-WWII standing army as “alien to the American experience”). 
 304 See MORRIS, supra note 13, at 5. 
 305 See Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 460 (Baker, J., dissenting); STONE, supra note 116, at 184–
85. 
 306 Military justice experts, such as retired Air Force Major General Charles Dunlap, 
point out that while certain members of Congress may be losing some faith in the military, 
public opinion polls continue to consider the military as highly respected. Could some of this 
high respect be artificially procured through Article 134’s chilling effect? See Dunlap, supra 
note 24, at 265. 
 307 Jim Golby et al., Thanks for Your Service: Civilian and Veteran Attitudes after 
Fifteen Years of War, in WARRIORS AND CITIZENS: AMERICAN VIEWS OF OUR MILITARY 137 
(Kori Schake & Jim Mattis eds., 2016). 
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integrity shouldn’t be artificially buoyed via criminalization of speech, or of 
other conduct, purely for some recruiting or support effect.308 Of course the 
military wants and needs public support; I am arguing that it needs to earn it by 
educating and training its members on the highest standards of integrity and not 
by criminalizing what it speculates erodes such support.  
If some military members go below those standards by lying to the 
Washington Post, as in the case of the Marine officer cited earlier,309 or by lying 
to a room full of high school students regarding one’s combat service, or by 
espousing white supremacist views online—then the public knows that liars and 
racists exist in the military and should weigh that knowledge in their personal 
calculus of support for the military.310 The military’s understandable desire to 
deter such behavior through its criminalization is outweighed by 
servicemembers’ First Amendment expressive rights; if, as a result of such 
speech, public support falls too low to sustain on-going military operations, then 
such operations should be curtailed or a draft pursued.311 Alternatively perhaps, 
good leadership will inculcate American values that the public will support.  
A last note on service-discrediting speech: in Rapert, an enlisted member’s 
contemptuous words regarding the President formed the basis of an Article 134 
communicating a threat conviction.312 In upholding this conviction, CAAF 
found that even if the Elonis subjective intent requirement for true threats had 
not been met, the speech was sufficiently service-discrediting and therefore 
criminal.313 In so doing, CAAF essentially allowed enlisted personnel to be 
convicted for conduct previously limited to officers under Article 88. Its 
rationale was a combination of both “the principle of civilian supremacy” over 
the military, and more importantly, a recognition that appellant’s speech 
“regarding the President of the United States—who also serves as the 
                                                                                                                     
 308 Experts also claim that distrust of the military at the highest levels of civilian policy-
making, a distrust that impedes decision-making and results in bad policy, is a direct result 
of “exaggerated estimate of military capabilities” stemming from public perceptions of the 
military. Perhaps if discrediting speech wasn’t criminalized, and hence culturally condemned 
within the military, such exaggerated estimates wouldn’t be as prevalent. See Rosa Brooks, 
Civil-Military Paradoxes, in WARRIORS AND CITIZENS: AMERICAN VIEWS OF OUR MILITARY 
44 (Kori Schake & Jim Mattis eds., 2016). 
 309 See generally Seck, supra note 4 (“Maj. Mark Thompson is set to face trial Thursday 
on charges of false official statement and conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.”). 
 310 See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 37 M.J. 558, 565 (A.C.M.R. 1993) (upholding 
Article 134 service-discrediting conviction of enlisted non-commissioned officer for giving 
speech in uniform at local high school and falsely bragging about combat exploits: “The 
government provided ample evidence of a diminished confidence by those who heard the 
appellant in the integrity of service-members in general . . . expressed a new distrust in the 
truthfulness of service personnel as a result of the appellant’s activity. The presentation, we 
note, occurred at a moment in time when confidence in the military by its nation was 
especially important.”).  
 311 See Bacevich, supra note 303, at 209 (explaining how the elimination of the draft has 
allowed the government to pursue largely unaccountable military operations). 
 312 United States v. Rapert, 75 M.J. 164, 165 (C.A.A.F. 2016). 
 313 Id. at 169–71. 
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Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces—unquestionably undermines the 
military’s unique interest in ensuring obedience to the chain of command.”314 
While I recommend that service-discrediting no longer serve as a criminal basis 
for conduct in the military, I also recommend that Article 88’s aperture be 
widened to include enlisted personnel’s contemptuous words, and not simply 
that of officers. As seen in Rapert, military personnel are already being so 
charged via the backdoor of Article 134, and the gravamen of harm of such 
speech coincides with Article 88—which is not the harm of service-discrediting 
speech, but the real danger of undermining the chain of command that leads to 
the President through other civilian leaders. 
C. Child Pornography Isn’t Criminal Because of Its Effect on the 
Military: Why Congress Needs to Fix the UCMJ  
Congress has neglected to specifically enumerate in the UCMJ numerous 
offenses that are criminal in most civilian jurisdictions. Instead, Article 134’s 
expansiveness has allowed the executive branch to unilaterally criminalize a 
huge range of behavior not elsewhere listed in the military’s penal code. Instead 
of modernizing the UCMJ, as states regularly do regarding their penal codes, 
Congress has simply left the military alone to handle a surprisingly long list of 
serious criminal misconduct as Article 134 service-discrediting or prejudicial to 
good order and discipline crimes.315  
By unilaterally adding crimes under Article 134 instead of delineating new 
UCMJ offenses through legislative reform, the military has diluted the 
normative force of Article 134 and weakened the credibility of the entire UCMJ. 
The MCM’s Appendix 12 provides the President’s illustrative, non-exhaustive 
list of crimes that can be charged as Article 134 clause one or two offenses, 
along with the President’s decision regarding their maximum punishments.316 
Over sixty-three distinct crimes are currently listed, each with a common 
element to be satisfied either by proof that conduct was service-discrediting or 
prejudicial to good order and discipline.317  
Well-known speech crimes, such as communicating a threat, solicitation to 
commit crimes other than combat-related crimes, obtaining services by false 
pretenses, bribery, and child pornography, as well as a slew of non-speech 
crimes such as kidnapping, child endangerment, and prostitution, are MCM-
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 315 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 933–34 (1958). 
 316 See MCM, supra note 22, at app. 12-6–12-8. 
 317 Manual provisions describing offenses cognizable under Article 134 are merely 
illustrative. See United States v. Johnson, 39 M.J. 1033, 1037 (A.C.M.R. 1994), aff’d, 17 
M.J. 251 (C.M.A. 1984) (citing United States v. McCormick, 30 C.M.R. 26, 28 (C.M.A. 
1960)). I count sixty-three primary Article 134 offenses listed in the MCM, though the count 
could be higher if one broke out the various iterations of specific 134, crimes such as child 
endangerment, which lists six different iterations of that crime. See MCM, supra note 22, at 
app. 12-5–12-7. 
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listed Article 134 crimes—unlike dueling, they do not have their own stand-
alone UCMJ provision.318 As such, all these crimes require the additional 
element of either prejudice or service-discrediting nature.319 The gravamen of 
harm of these specific crimes, speech or not, obviously has nothing to do with 
the military; in fact, the vast majority of the President’s list of Article 134 crimes 
have nothing to do with the military per se. These acts constitute crimes across 
America because of other damage they wreak, such as violence to children and 
others; their harms are completely distinct from any effect they may 
speculatively have on a military unit’s good order and discipline or the 
military’s reputation. By shoe-horning these serious crimes into Article 134’s 
catch-all provisions, their seriousness is undervalued.320 
 Furthermore, by including a wide range of misconduct that is otherwise 
criminal in Article 134’s catch-all scope, the normative message regarding the 
actual harm that is true prejudice to good order and discipline is diluted; as 
argued previously, service-discrediting is either not a harm or is insufficient to 
serve as a criminal basis, so its dilution is irrelevant.321 But prejudice to good 
order and discipline is an enormously relevant concern, given that the dynamic 
of good order and discipline constitutes the nervous system of the military, and 
as such is imperative for effective functioning. By requiring child pornography 
to be prejudicial to good order and discipline, and in finding that this element is 
met in every case regardless the circumstance, Article 134’s prejudicial element 
is essentially read out of the crime—as it should be, but through separate 
enumeration, not through such a false legal fiction. Such contorted findings of 
prejudice undermine the normative value of criminalizing speech, as well as 
other conduct that is criminal exclusively because of such prejudice. 
That is, the only Article 134 offenses that should remain are those whose 
true gravamen of harm is actual prejudice to good order and discipline. Congress 
should separately enumerate all Article 134 crimes that are criminal because 
they represent separate harms to society and were simply placed in Article 134 
by the President as a matter of convenience.322 The distinction between what 
stays and goes is easy to make—if the Appendix 12, MCM-listed Article 134 
offense is also a crime in civilian jurisdictions, then its criminality does not, nor 
should, turn on its effect on military good order and discipline—it therefore 
                                                                                                                     
 318 See id. 
 319 See id. The majority of MCM-listed Article 134 crimes are non-speech crimes, such 
as bigamy, animal abuse, prostitution, and feeling the scene of an accident. Id. 
 320 By failing to separately enumerate these crimes without a service-discrediting or 
prejudicial to good order and discipline element, as they should, Congress implies that 
communicating a threat is less of a crime than, for example, dueling or stalking, which have 
both earned their own criminal UCMJ article. See id. at app. 12-3–12-4. 
 321 See supra Part IV.C. 
 322 See 10 U.S.C. 934 (1958); Avrech v. Sec’y of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237, 1243 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) rev’d on other grounds (noting that the list of Article 134 offenses enumerated by 
the President “is patched together in the Manual for Court-Martial, issued as an Executive 
Order of the President under Article 36 of the Code, which authorizes the President to 
prescribe “procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial”). 
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warrants its own UCMJ article.323 Such UCMJ re-structuring sends a strong 
message regarding what harms should be punished and why, and strengthens 
Article 134’s normative message by narrowing it to those few crimes whose 
gravamen of harm truly is prejudice to good order and discipline that is not 
separately captured elsewhere. 
D. Strict Scrutiny for Speech Crimes 
The elimination of the service-discrediting military crime plus the penal 
code re-ordering recommended above leave unanswered the primary question 
posed at this Article’s onset. What doctrinal approach regarding First 
Amendment constitutionality should apply to the catch-all speech crimes: 
Article 134 prejudicial to good order and discipline (and service-discrediting if 
that crime unfortunately remains); Article 133 conduct-unbecoming; or 
Articles 90, 91, and 92 disobedience crimes, when they turn on refusal to obey 
an order restricting speech?  
Examples abound. Regarding Article 133, these are crimes such as that 
committed by Major Thompson in 2017 when he was convicted of conduct 
unbecoming for lying to the Washington Post;324 for Article 92, these are crimes 
such as violating a regulation governing political activities for political 
comments made on Facebook;325 and for Article 134, for making disloyal 
statements as in the famous Parker case,326 or more recently, for making 
threatening comments about the President that do not constitute true threats.327 
The answer: when Article 133, Article 134, or a disobedience article 
(Articles 90, 91, or 92) criminalizes speech, strict scrutiny should apply.328 
These offenses are simply not obvious manifestations of unique military harm 
like the category two crimes described in Part IV.A and therefore should not 
                                                                                                                     
 323 For example, the Article 134 crime of false swearing has been used to convict lying 
to a military criminal investigator because the court found such lying to be service-
discrediting. United States v. Greene, 34 M.J. 713, 713 (A.C.M.R. 1992). Instead, false 
swearing to a criminal investigator should be a stand-alone offense, analogous to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001 (2012). 
 324 See Cox, supra note 74. 
 325 See, e.g., Stein v. Dowling, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1090–93 (S.D. Cal. 2012) 
(discussing military administrative board dismissal of Marine for, inter alia, an Article 92 
violation). 
 326 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 753 (1974). 
 327 Of the President’s list of exemplar Article 134 crimes, this includes disloyal 
statements; indecent language that falls outside the traditional category of obscenity; 
disrespect to a sentinel; wrongful refusal to testify; communicating a threat (but only if the 
military uses it to charge speech that does not meet the Elonis standard of true threats); and 
wearing unauthorized insignia. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001. 2017–18 (2015) 
(deferring to the appellate courts to determine whether a true threat requires a subjective 
intent to threaten). 
 328 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27–28 (2010) (concluding that 
generally applicable laws that punish based on content of speech receive strict scrutiny). 
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benefit from the speech-integral to crime exception. As recognized by the Court 
in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, citing Cohen v. California, when “the 
generally applicable law was directed at Cohen because of what his speech 
communicated—he violated the breach of the peace statute because of the 
offensive content of his particular message. We accordingly applied more 
rigorous scrutiny.”329  
Just as the Court accordingly applied strict scrutiny to the generally 
applicable terrorism statute at issue in Humanitarian Law Project, strict scrutiny 
should apply to these five UCMJ articles when they punish speech “because of 
what [the] speech communicate[s].”330 There is simply too great a possibility, 
given the malleability of Articles 133, 134, and the disobedience articles, for the 
military to declare speech prejudicial to good order and discipline, or conduct 
unbecoming, or prohibited by regulation or order, without requiring a close 
causal connection to serious harm, and that deserves the closest of judicial 
examination.331 While I believe that the military’s application of these articles 
will many times fail strict scrutiny due to lack of narrow tailoring, in other 
instances such crimes may, like in Humanitarian Law Project itself, withstand 
such close circumspection.332 For example, the Article 134 crime of disloyal 
speech, which includes an express intent, appears ready to withstand such 
scrutiny, once the old bad tendency test’s inference of said intent is no longer 
allowed, and the military changes accordingly.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Justice Blackmun noted in Parker v. Levy that “it is not desirable that the 
standard of the Army shall come down to the requirements of a criminal 
code.”333 He is right in the fact that military standards go above and beyond the 
UCMJ and that the Armed Forces commensurately have numerous non-criminal 
means to enforce such standards and manage the behavior of their forces. While 
military standards don’t have to come down, the UCMJ does have to measure 
up to the standards of a modern military code, one that is reconciled with the 
First Amendment and with the role of the military in American democracy. 
                                                                                                                     
 329 Id. at 28 (emphasis added) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971)). 
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 331 The disobedience crimes presuppose lawful orders, with the criteria for lawfulness 
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Fletcher v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 541, 563 (Ct. Cl. 1891)). 
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Replacing the untethered, speculative approach to military speech crimes 
that courts have used for the last forty-plus years will align military criminal law 
with modern First Amendment doctrine. This recalibration is necessary as an 
expression of modern American society’s moral support for most speech. 
Despite the UCMJ’s theoretical reflection of American society’s values, it has 
for too long primarily mirrored military society’s reflexive, unanalyzed 
assumptions regarding what is good and necessary for internal and external 
military effectiveness.  
This Article is not purely an academic exercise, untethered from the reality 
of today’s heightened partisan divide, politicization of the military, and ease of 
the military’s current speech crimes. The flawed jurisprudence supporting 
servicemembers’ prosecution are and will continue to allow the gross trampling 
of their First Amendment right to free speech, to the detriment of our entire 
society. Case in point: an Oregon National Guard member was disciplined in 
June of 2018 for merely tweeting his opinion about a political issue; his 
command publicly stated that “[y]ou can’t endorse any sort of political action 
while in uniform,” despite no such endorsement being made, and of course 
missing the point that service members remain supposedly free to express 
personal political opinions.334 This eyebrow-raising failure to comprehend that 
military members do no shed all their expressive freedoms when they don the 
uniform except in discrete, limited situations flows in part from the UCMJ’s 
vague and overly-broad criminalization of speech.  
The courts can and should hold the military criminal code’s speech crimes 
to the same constitutional standards applied to the rest of the nation by adopting 
the approaches recommended in this Article. Congress can ensure the UCMJ 
supports good order and discipline, and hence military effectiveness, through 
the straightforward statutory reform this Article recommends. Our national 
security is strengthened when American core values are thoroughly 
operationalized, and that is the goal of such changes. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 334 The guardsman tweeted, regarding a fundraiser to raise money to reunite immigrant 
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